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INTRODUCTION
In the battle against overloaded criminal dockets and overburdened
judicial resources,' one District of Columbia federal judge2 has fired
a shot that may wound the constitutional right to a jury trial.' The
bullet comes in the form of an additional six-month sentence that the
judge stated he had imposed solely because the defendant opted to
go to trial rather than plead guilty.4 Although the judge explicitly
requested that his decision be reviewed for "constitutional error,"5
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en banc
in United States v. Jones,6 affirmed without addressing the constitution-
al questions raised by such an apparent enhancement of sentence for
exercising the right to trial.' The court avoided a constitutional
discussion by characterizing the judge's sentencing order as a denial
1. Cf Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting
Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393, 403 (1991) (noting
judges' perception of decline in plea bargaining and increased need for trials).
2. See United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (relating federal district
courtjudge Thomas PenfieldJackson's decision to enhance sentence solely because defendant
elected to go to trial), af'd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d
704 (1994).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial .... ").
4. See Sentencing Transcript at 13, United States v. Jones, No. 90-240 (D.D.C. Jan. 24,
1991) (adding six months to defendant's sentence because case "did go to trial" and indicating
that, had defendant pled guilty in advance of trial, judge would have imposed minimum
sentence that guidelines allowed).
5. Id. ("I would like to know whether or not there is some constitutional error I commit
by recognizing that the case was taken to trial, albeit a matter of constitutional right to take the
case to trial, rather than acknowledging in advance the guilt that was obviously supported by the
proof.").
6. 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cart. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
7. United States v.Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126
L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
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of the full benefit8 allowed under section 3E1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines9 for "acceptance of responsibility""° as
8. See id. at 1477 (finding that trial judge had denied full benefit but had not imposed
penalty).
9. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 3El.1 (Nov. 1992)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G]. The United States Sentencing Commission, see 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988)
(establishing Sentencing Commission and specifying its purposes), promulgated the Guidelines
pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
The Sentencing Guidelines provide a numerical basis that correlates the nature of the offense
charged with a number of mitigating or aggravating factors. See U.S.S.G., supra, § 5A (containing
sentencing table listing 43 offense levels and six criminal history categories). After computing
the defendant's base offense level, the judge must make adjustments, either up or down, based
on (1) the harm to the victim, (2) the defendant's role in the offense, (3) any obstruction of
justice, (4) whether the defendant was convicted on multiple counts, and (5) whether the
defendant has accepted personal responsibility. Id. §§ 1B1.1 (a) to (e). After adjusting for any
of these factors, the judge must then calculate the defendant's criminal history category. Id. §
4A1.1. The judge then computes the sentencing range according to the defendant's total
offense level and criminal history categories. Id. § 5A. See generallyJoshua S. Levy & Bruce L.
Plotkin, Project, Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals 1989-90---Sentencing, 79 GEO. LJ. 1089, 1089-1107 (1991) (providing overview
of how judges calculate offense levels under Sentencing Guidelines).
Congress had passed the Act to address disparities in sentencing that developed due to broad
discretion on the part of sentencingjudges. SeeS. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. 3182, 3221 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225] (noting that reliance on
"outmoded rehabilitation model" of punishment allowedjudges tojustify individualized sentence
determinations and produced wide disparity in sentences). Prior to the Guidelines,judges had
long labored under the assumption that punishment served the purposes of rehabilitating the
offender. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), Justice Black stated: "Retribution is
no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." 337 U.S. at 248; see also
Charles R. Eskridge, Note, The Constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act After Mistretta
v. United States, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 683, 687, 688 n.29 (1990) (noting that Williams introduced era
of rehabilitation as primary theory of criminal punishment). Rehabilitation differs from its
precursor, retribution, in that rehabilitation focuses on the personality of the criminal, not
merely the criminal act. See Eskridge, supra, at 688 n.29 (asserting that modern criminology
considers personality of offender to be as important as his or her act) (citing G. PATON, A
TEXTBOOK OFJURISPRUDENCE (1946)).
The rehabilitative model of punishment, however, came under attack for its premise that
criminal behavior could be treated like a disease. See MARviN E. FRANREL, CRIMINAL SENTENcES:
LAw WrrtouT ORDER 89 (1973) (noting that rehabilitative model operates under dubious
premise that "criminals are 'sick' in some way that calls for 'treatment"). Congress found that
because sentencing laws did not reflect the problems inherent in the rehabilitative model, each
judge acted on the basis of his or her "own notion of the purposes of sentencing." S. REP. No.
225, supra, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3221. Such individualized determinations
produced "an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted
of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances." Id.
The Sentencing Guidelines have received both praise and criticism. Compare DanielJ. Freed,
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101
YALE LJ. 1681, 1683 (1992) (suggesting thatSentencing Guidelines suffer in quality because they
do not allow room for departures to accommodate cases of varying degrees of seriousness) with
AndrewJ. Kleinfeld, The Sentencing Guidelines Promote Truth and Justice, FED. PROBATION, Dec.
1991, at 16 (asserting that sentencing law should reflect social consensus and not individual
judges' preferences).
10. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1(a) (providing for two-level reduction in criminal
offense level if defendant accepts responsibility). Jones was sentenced under the 1991 edition
of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §
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opposed to a penalty for going to trial."
The D.C. Circuit's decision in United States v. Jones deserves
attention for the questions that it raises regarding the extent to which
a judge may burden the constitutional right to trial. The decision is
a victory for judges who desire to clear clogged court dockets by
encouraging plea bargaining.12 The opinion, however, represents a
marked departure from the unanimous opinion of other circuits that
sentence adjustments based solely on defendants' decisions not to
plead guilty constitute impermissible penalties for exercising a
constitutional right."3
Part I of this Note traces the history of the law regarding the
constitutionality of sentencing schemes that burden a defendant's
constitutional right to trial. This part begins by examining earlier
Supreme Court decisions demonstrating concern over "chilling" a
defendant's decision to exercise the right to trial. 4 More recent
3E1.1 (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter 1991 U.S.S.G.]. Under either version of the Guidelines, though,
a guilty plea is good evidence that a defendant is deserving of credit for accepting responsibility.
Compare id. § 3E1.1 comment. (n.3) (stating that guilty plea constitutes "significant evidence" of
acceptance of responsibility) with U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1 comment. (n.3) (duplicating
substantially text of 1991 U.S.S.G. but adding that guilty plea does not entitle defendant to
adjustment "as a matter of right").
Because the defendant in Jones had not pled guilty, the en banc court concluded that the
Guidelines required the sentencing judge to withhold leniency. Jones, 997 F.2d at 1478 (en
banc). The court also noted that the defendant already had received a benefit because the
judge imposed a sentence that was at the bottom of the permissible range under the Guidelines.
Id. at 1478-79.
11. See United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (expressing view that
judge's sentencing order constituted "extra time"), aft'd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en
banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
12. Cf. Karle & Sager, supra note 1, at 403-04 (positing that incidence of plea bargaining
may decline due to lack of incentives to negotiate pleas under federal sentencing guidelines);
U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1 comment. (n.3) (providing that guilty plea will not guarantee
reduced sentence).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362 (7th Cir. 1992) (declaring that
defendant may not be subjected to more severe punishment for exercising constitutionally
protected right to jury trial), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 1026 (1993); United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d
587,592-93 (9th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting sentencing court from considering defendant's exercise
of constitutional right, including right to trial, against defendant when making sentencing
decision); United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 774 (6th Cir. 1990) (barring districtjudge from
penalizing defendant for exercising constitutional right to jury trial even if evidence of guilt is
overwhelming); United States v. Mazzaferro, 865 F.2d 450, 460 (1st Cir. 1989) (declaring that
judge may not punish defendant for exercising constitutional right to stand trial); United States
v. Hutchings, 757 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing trial court for considering sentence
increase for defendant's decision to stand trial), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1031 (1985); Hess v. United
States, 496 F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1974) (ruling that defendant's decision to exercise
constitutional right to trial by jury must have no effect on sentencing decision).
14. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (declaring that punishing
individual for exercising constitutional rights constitutes due process violation of "the most basic
sort"); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-26 (1969) (warning that court must not use
its power to coerce defendant); United States v.Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-85 (1968) (holding
unconstitutional federal statute that guaranteed life imprisonment for defendants who pled
guilty but required death penalty for those convicted by jury).
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Court decisions, however, permit schemes that burden the right to
trial, but where both the defendant and the state stand to benefit.15
This Note specifically examines inducements to plead guilty and waive
one's right to trial under the federal sentencing laws. Part I con-
cludes by examining the difficulty in distinguishing a denial of the
benefit of a sentence reduction for refusing to plead guilty from the
imposition of a penalty for exercising the right to trial.
Part II provides the facts and procedural history of United States v.
Jones and examines and analyzes the reasoning of both the panel and
en banc opinions of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The
facts reveal the unilateral nature of the district court judge's action.
Although the trial judge factored into his sentencing decision the
defendant's failure to plead guilty,16 the prosecutor refused to
engage in plea negotiations with the defendant." The procedural
history indicates the complexity of the case in that both a panel of the
D.C. Circuit and the entire D.C. Circuit affirmed, but on widely
different interpretations as to whether the judge's order constituted
a denial of a full benefit or an imposition of an enhanced sen-
tence."8 Ultimately, it is evident that the panel decision 9 relies on
an overly broad interpretation of the relevant constitutional prece-
dent."0 In contrast, the en banc decision2' rests on an overly
narrow reading of the trial judge's order, a reading that avoids the
15. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978) (allowing state to burden
exercise of right to trial by encouraging guilty pleas); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753
(1970) (holding constitutional state scheme whereby state offered benefit to defendants by
granting leniency at sentencing when defendants offered benefit to state by confessing guilt).
16. United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 928,932 (D.C. Cir. 1992), af'd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (en banc), crt. deni, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
17. See Appellant's Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 3, United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3025), afd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc) (noting that only
plea that prosecutor offered was for defendant to plead guilty to crime charged), cert. denied, 126
L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994); see also infra note 130 (describing policy of U.S. Attorney not to engage
in plea bargaining).
18. Compare United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (characterizing six-
month sentence as "extra time") with United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1477 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (en banc) (characterizing six-month sentence as "less of a benefit" than defendant who
showed greater remorse at earlier stage in proceedings would have received).
19. References in this Note to the "panel" decision refer to the opinion of the majority in
United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The majority consisted of Judges
Silberman and Williams. The majority did not include ChiefJudge Mikva, who filed a separate
opinion in which he concurred in part and dissented in part.
20. SeeJones, 973 F.2d at 940 (Mikva, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
that majority had characterized precedent at "sweeping level of generality," ignoring Supreme
Court's observant differentiation between diverse state actors and diverse situations in which they
act).
21. References in this Note to the "en banc" decision refer to the opinion of the majority
in United States v.Jones, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc). The majority consisted of
Judges Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Silberman, Buckley, Williams, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Henderson,
and Randolph. Judges Mikva, Wald, Edwards, and Sentelle filed dissenting opinions.
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constitutional questions entirely." Both decisions, however, reach
the conclusion that a judge may weigh against a defendant the fact
that she exercised the right to trial.2
3
Part III recommends that the United States Sentencing Commission
propose for congressional enactment 24 an amendment to the
Sentencing Guidelines prohibiting judges from imposing enhanced
sentences or denying the benefit of a sentencing reduction solely
because a defendant refuses to plead guilty. Reform of the
Guidelines' mandatory minima is also necessary to encourage
defendants to plead guilty without requiring judges to resort to
actions that chill the right to trial.
This Note concludes that, by affirming the sentencing judge's
order, the D.C. Circuit panel and en banc opinions ignore important
distinctions between courts, prosecutors, and legislatures in an
adversarial system of criminal justice. Such a breakdown of the
adversarial system is apparent in the sentencing order of the trial
judge in United States v. Jones. The judge turned the defendant's
punishment into a test case and deprived him of liberty, in the words
of Immanuel Kant, "merely as a means subservient to the purposes of
another."'
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SENTENCING DIFFERENTIAiLS
The plain text of the Constitution says nothing about the permissi-
bility of "sentencing differentials," a term that signifies the disparity
between the sentence that a defendant receives for pleading guilty
and the sentence that the same defendant would receive for exercis-
ing his right to trial.26 The Fifth Amendment protection against
22. See Jones, 997 F.2d at 1488 (en banc) (Wald,J., dissenting) (asserting that en banc court
had read record to find different case than that decided by district court in order to "avoid a
troublesome constitutional conflict").
23. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 937-38 (stating thatjudge may use defendant's decision to exercise
right to trial as "evidence that defendant has not accepted responsibility"); Jones, 997 F.2d at
1479 (holding that sentencing judge may offset credit for acceptance of responsibility against
decision to go to trial because assertion of trial right belies sincerity of acceptance of
responsibility).
24. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988), at the beginning of a regular session of
Congress, but not later than the first day of May, the Commission may submit to Congress
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. Such amendments take effect on the first day of
November unless the amendments are modified or rejected by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p)
(1988).
25. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (emphasis
added).
26. See United States v. Klotz, 943 F.2d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing "sentencing
differential" as "one sentence if the defendant is mum (or insists on trial), a lower sentence if
the defendant sings (or pleads guilty)").
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compelled self-incrimination 27 and the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of the right to a jury trial28 would appear to prohibit enhancements
or reductions of sentences based solely on a defendant's decision to
stand trial.' Furthermore, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
guarantees of "due process of law" 0 would seem to disfavor any
action in which a judge is, or appears to be, biased against a
defendant who exercises her right to trial." Finally, the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection 2 would appear to
prohibit differential sentencing where a defendant who pleads guilty
to an offense receives a lesser sentence than another defendant who
is tried and convicted for committing the same offense. 3
While seemingly straightforward, these constitutional guarantees
have proven to be elastic in the hands of the Supreme Court with
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The protection against forced self-incrimination applies at
sentencing proceedings. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (applying Fifth
Amendment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination to state sentencing proceeding by
way of Fourteenth Amendment).
The Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination comports with an adversarial
model of criminal justice in that it "spare[s] the accused from having to reveal, directly or
indirectly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his
thoughts with the Government." Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988); see also
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (stating that adversarial system of criminal justice
mandates that government produce evidence against defendant "by its own independent labors,"
rather than through "cruel, simple expedient" of compulsion).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment serves the adversarial model by
preserving the right to trial. Cf. Randolph N. Jonakait, Foreword: Notes for a Consistent and
Meaningful Sixth Amendment 82J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 726 (1992) (positing that right
to jury trial in criminal cases is core of Sixth Amendment).
29. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (stating that "inevitable effect" of
provision that guaranteed life imprisonment for defendants who plead guilty but required death
penalty for those convicted by jury was "to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right
not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand ajury trial").
But see Daniel J. Capra, Sentencing Guidelines and the Fifth Amendment; N.Y. LJ.,Jan. 3, 1991, at 3,
3 (noting that although Supreme Court has found imposition of penalty for exercising Fifth
Amendment right to be "impermissible compulsion," Court has been "more vague" on question
of whether conditioning benefit on waiver of Fifth Amendment right constitutes compulsion).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. See United States v. Crocker, 788 F.2d 802, 809 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding thatjudge's
mid-trial warning that he would take into account at sentencing defendant's "imposing upon the
time and resources of the Court," might induce defendant to doubt judge's impartiality); see also
infra note 202 (discussing reasons underlying prohibition on judicial involvement in plea
negotiations). But cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978) (allowing state to
encourage guilty pleas by offering "substantial benefits" in exchange for pleas).
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2638-39 (1993) ("Classifications neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines do ... run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause if there is [not] a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and a
legitimate governmental purpose."). But seeUnited States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457,466 n.12 (10th
Cir. 1990) (refusing to find equal protection violation in sentencing scheme that provided
leniency for defendants who admitted guilt because such scheme was "rationally related to
government's legitimate interest in rehabilitating convicted criminals"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1125
(1991).
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regard to differential sentencing schemes.' The Court initially
determined that differential sentencing is constitutionally prohibit-
ed. 5 More recent decisions, however, acknowledge that these
measures burden constitutional rights but allow them on the grounds
that they conserve scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources and
benefit defendants who plead guilty.36 Nevertheless, a question left
open by the Court's decisions is the extent to which ajudge may, on
his own initiative, employ a sentencing scheme to encourage a
defendant to waive his rights.
A. Sentencing Differentials as a Burden on Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has declared that punishing a defendant for
exercising her constitutional rights is a "due process violation of the
most basic sort." 7  The Court has also barred agents of the state
from pursuing courses of action calculated to penalize defendants for
exercising constitutional rights. 8 The U.S. Courts of Appeals,
following Supreme Court precedent, also purport to prohibit actions
that penalize a defendant for exercising constitutional rights.'9
The Supreme Court, however, has not been resolute in its
opposition to all schemes that may burden the defendant's decision
to exercise his constitutional rights.' The Court's analysis of such
34. See generally Luke T. Dokla, Section 3E1.1 Contrition and Fifth Amendment Incrimination:
Is There an Iron Fist Beneath the Sentencing Guidelines' Velvet Glove?, 65 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 1077, 1094
n.73 (1991) (discussing Supreme Court's failure to consider sentencing schemes that grant
leniency in exchange for admissions of guilt to be unconstitutional conditions) (citing Corbitt
v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978)); Capra, supra note 29, at 3 (illustrating how Supreme
Court has found imposing punishments for invocation of rights to be unconstitutional in some
contexts but not others).
35. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968) (concluding that sentencing
schemes chill exercise of right to trial by needlessly encouraging guilty pleas).
36. E.g., Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1978) (recognizing benefit to state
through encouragement of guilty pleas).
37. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). In Bordenhircher, however, the Court
determined that there is no element of punishment in the "give-and-take" of plea bargaining
because the defendant is at liberty to "accept or reject the prosecution's offer." Id.
38. Id. (deeming actions intended to penalize defendant for exercising constitutional right
'patently unconstitutional").
39. See, e.g., United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1991) (prohibiting
retaliation on part of sentencing judge for defendant's decision to exercise right to trial), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1585 (1992); United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 774 (6th Cir. 1990) (barring
district judge from penalizing defendant for exercising constitutional right even if evidence of
his guilt is "overwhelming") (quoting United States v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1, 3 (6th Cir. 1975));
United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that sentencingjudge may not
hold "constitutionally protected conduct" against defendant) (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 462-63 (1981)).
40. In the context of plea bargaining, the Court has expressed a willingness to allow the
threat of an enhancement of punishment: 'While confronting a defendant with the risk of more
severe punishment clearly may have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his
trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable'-and permissi-
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schemes initially began with a subjective, defendant-oriented inquiry
into the "chilling" of a defendant's rights." The Court then shifted
to a judge-oriented or prosecutor-oriented inquiry into "vindictive"42
behavior against a defendant who exercises her constitutional
rights." The Court subsequently abandoned this line of inquiry and
required that the accused challenge the characteristics of the scheme,
rather than the behavior of the judge or prosecutor."
1. The chilling effect
The Supreme Court's inquiry into the subjective impact of a
sentencing scheme on a defendant's decisionmaking process
originated in United States v. Jackson.' In Jackson, the Court ex-
pressed concern about the "chilling" effect a sentencing scheme may
have on a defendant's decision to exercise his right to trial. 6 The
Court invalidated a portion of the Federal Kidnaping Act47 that gave
the jury discretion to impose the death penalty on a defendant
convicted of kidnaping, but did not provide a similar penalty for a
defendant who waived her right to a jury trial or pled guilty.4"
ble-'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of
pleas.'" Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)).
41. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussing Court's inquiry into chilling
effect of sentence enhancement in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)).
42. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (defining "vindictiveness" as "practices
tending to deter the exercise of a right to trial or appeal by attaching a risk of heavier
punishment").
43. See infra text accompanying notes 51-53 (discussing presumption of vindictiveness set
forth in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)); see also Barbara A. Schwartz, The Limits
ofPrmsecutorial Vindictiveness, 69 IowA L. REV. 127, 152-56 (1983) (describing shift in Court's focus
from reasoning based on chilling effect to reasoning based on vindictiveness). Schwartz also
posits that the primary purpose of the rule announced in Pearce was to help reviewing courts
determine whether enhanced sentences were motivated by judicial vindictiveness. Schwartz,
supra, at 140.
44. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing cases decided since Pearce); see
also Schwartz, supra note 43, at 143 (observing that later cases weigh objective characteristics of
presentencing procedure more heavily than specific evidence of vindictive conduct in
ascertaining degree of constitutional protection defendant receives).
45. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
46. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (finding that danger comes not
from incidental chilling effect of statute, but from chilling effect that is "unnecessary and
therefore excessive").
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
48. SeeJackson, 390 U.S. at 570-71 (reciting provisions of Federal Kidnaping Act). The Court
indicated that a less ambiguous statute might pass constitutional muster because congressional
action is required to deny a court's authority to accept a guilty plea. Id. at 585. The
Government argued that the Court could correct the statute by using its supervisory powers to
"instruct federal judges ... to reject all attempts to waive jury trial and all efforts to plead
guilty." Id. at 584. All defendants charged with kidnaping under federal law would thereby be
guaranteed the right to trial and, if found guilty, could be sentenced to death. Id. The Court
rejected the notion that the judiciary should impose limits on itself to accept or reject guilty
pleas. See id. at 585 (finding power of court to accept guilty plea to be "traditional and
fundamental") (quoting United States v. Willis, 75 F. Supp. 628, 630 (D.D.C. 1948)). It
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Furthermore, the Court found the death penalty provision unconstitu-
tional in that it tended to "discourage assertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial."' The Court concluded
that a statute need not "coerce" guilty pleas and jury trial waivers to
be violative of a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; it
need only "needlessly encourage" one to plead guilty or waive one's
right to a trial.50
2. The presumption of vindictiveness
After Jackson, the Supreme Court shifted its focus from a broad
concern about "chilling" the exercise of the right to trial to a more
narrow analysis of whether ajudge or prosecutor intended to burden
the exercise of such a right. In North Carolina v. Pearce,51 the Court
held that a presumption of "vindictiveness" exists "whenever a judge
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new
trial."52 To rebut such a presumption, the record must show that the
longer sentence was based on "objective information concerning
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the
time of the original sentence."5 3
In cases decided since Pearce, however, the Court has expressed an
increasing reluctance to presume vindictiveness and has required that
the defendant demonstrate that a particular sentencing scheme is
unconstitutional. 54  In Blackledge v. Perry,55 the Court summarized
the development of the vindictiveness standard since Pearce and
concluded that a violation of due process must constitute more than
a mere possibility of vindictiveness.5 6  The Court concluded that it
is necessary for the defendant to show a "realistic likelihood of
suggested, however, that Congress could impose such a restriction on judges. Id.
49. Id. at 581.
50. Id. at 583.
51. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
52. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-26 (1969).
53. Id. at 726.
54. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (adopting realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness standard for purposes of challenging sentencing scheme's constitutionality);
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35 (1973) (holding that possibility of higher sentence on
retrial does not impermissibly burden right to appeal); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104,117-18
(1972) (holding that higher sentence at de novo trial in jurisdictions that employ two-tier trial
system does not give rise to presumption of vindictiveness because of absence of retaliatory
motive on part of second trial court). See generally Michael D. Beck, Note, Preventing Vindictiveness
in Retrials-Is the Distinction Between Prosecutor, Judge and Jusy Realy Justified?, 6 CRiM. JUST.J. 235,
256-59 (1983) (asserting that Supreme Court has construed too narrowly circumstances where
Pearce guidelines are necessary).
55. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
56. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1974).
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'vindictiveness."'57
In United States v. Goodwin,"8 the Court further elevated the
defendant's burden of demonstrating vindictiveness.59 There, the
Court refused to entertain the presumption that a prosecutor's action
was vindictive even where he reindicted the defendant on a felony
charge after the defendant had refused to plead guilty to a misde-
meanor charge for the same criminal conduct.' Nevertheless, the
Court in Goodwin underscored the basic conclusion of Pearce: that
schemes tending to deter the exercise of the right to trial or appeal
by introducing a possibility of higher punishment are vindictive.61
B. Sentencing Differentials as a Benefit to the State and the Defendant
In contrast to earlier decisions that found certain sentencing
schemes unconstitutional because they introduced the risk of higher
punishment for exercising rights,62 more recent cases have upheld
waivers of the right to trial in circumstances where the process clearly
encouraged such waivers by offering leniency at sentencing.63
57. Id. at 27. The Blackledge Court found that a prosecutor's threat to bring more severe
charges against a defendant who sought de novo rehearing of his conviction on a lesser charge
would give rise to a realistic likelihood that the prosecutor was vindictively punishing the
defendant for exercising his right to a rehearing. Id. at 27-28.
58. 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
59. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 (1982) (refusing to allow per se rule
ofvindictiveness where prosecutor reindicted defendant on more serious charge after defendant
had refused to plead guilty). See generally Murray R. Garnick, Note, Two Models of Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REV. 467, 467-68 (1983) (arguing that Goodwin evidences Court's trend
away from due process model toward crime control model).
60. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 (finding it unlikely that prosecutor would respond to
defendant's refusal to plead guilty by pursuing indictments that were not in public interest).
But see id. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that prosecutors are likely to be vindictive
in pretrial period because of their desire to avoid work that preparation for trial necessitates).
61. Id. at 372-84 (reiterating conclusion of Pearce that punishment for exercise of right to
trial violates due process and refusing to foreclose possibility that defendant may prove in
appropriate case that prosecutor's charging decision was motivated by vindictiveness).
62. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (declaring that punishing person
for exercising rights is "due process violation of the most basic sort").
63. Se, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 809 F.2d 1504, 1507 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that
extension of leniency in return for guilty plea is permissible) (quoting Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439
U.S. 212, 223 (1978)); Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 1514, 1519 (11th Cir. 1985) (refusing
to prohibit judge from conditioning leniency on admission of guilt), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); United States v. Thompson, 476 F.2d 1196,1201
(7th Cir.) (refusing to equate showing of leniency toward defendant who admits guilt with policy
of punishing those who elect to require state to show proof at trial), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 918
(1973).
Reliance on a guilty plea for a sentence reduction has long been considered a permissible
strategic decision for defense counsel. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970)
(refusing to find that guilty plea was compelled for Fifth Amendment purposes where counsel
advised client that judge usually was more lenient toward defendants who pled guilty than to
those who exercised right to trial). As a strategic decision, however, defense counsel often
mistakenly relied on a particular judge's reputation for conditioning leniency on admission of
guilt. SeeStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984) (finding in capital sentencing case
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Sentencing schemes that encourage waiver of rights through offers of
leniency involve either "explicit" or "implicit" bargaining." In
"explicit bargaining," the defense counsel and the prosecutor engage
in contract-style negotiations over the degree of punishment.'
"Implicit bargaining" between judge and defendant is evident in the
long standing judicial practice of considering guilty pleas as evidence
of "contrition"66 or "acceptance of responsibility"67 for purposes of
granting leniency at sentencing.' The Court has approved both
explicit and implicit bargaining because of the benefits of guilty pleas
to both the defendant and society.
6 9
that defense counsel erroneously made strategic decision to rely on client's remorse although
judge had tendency to be more lenient toward defendants who demonstrated remorse).
64. See Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117
F.R.D. 459, 471 (1987) (describing "implicit bargaining" as "practice of sentencing defendants
who plead guilty less severely than defendants who are convicted atjury trials" and "explicit
bargaining" as practice of negotiation that"occurs between prosecutors and defense attorneys").
65. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE LJ. 1909,
1910 (1992) (arguing that classical contract theory supports freedom to bargain over criminal
punishment).
66. See United States v. Thompson, 476 F.2d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir.) (noting that contrition
may be evidenced by admitting guilt), cert. denied 414 U.S. 918 (1973).
67. SeeUnited States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that acceptance
of responsibility was permissible consideration in sentencing long before enactment of
Sentencing Guidelines).
68. Professor Alschuler of the University of Colorado Law School notes empirical evidence
indicating that the practice of implicit bargaining may provide more incentive to plead guilty
than the "explicit" bargaining between defense attorneys and prosecutors. See Alschuler, supra
note 64, at 471 (suggesting "that 'implicit' bargaining may be more significant in shaping
sentences in the federal courts than. . . 'explicit' bargaining"). Professor Alschuler also cites
evidence indicating that federal judges seem to offer significant deductions in penalty to
defendants who plead guilty. See id. at 471 n.45 (noting that average sentence issued when
defendant pleads guilty may be as much as 40% below that if defendant had been convicted at
trial) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 48 (1987)).
69. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Santobello, the Court reasoned:
Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process
but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to the prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial;
it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge
and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty
when they are ultimately imprisoned.
Id. at 261; see also infranotes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court arguments
in favor of encouraging entry of guilty pleas and facilitating plea bargaining). See generally
Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 966-67
(1986) (discussing research findings suggesting that plea bargaining is neutral component of
criminal case that neither undermines preventive influence of law nor creates "two tier
sentencing system"). But see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to
Tia: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931 (1983). Professor Alschuler
finds that plea bargaining treats human liberty as a "commodity," id. at 932, makes "figureheads
ofjudges," id. at 933, "promotes perceptions of corruption," id., "increases the likelihood of
favoritism and personal influence," id. at 934, and "treats almost every legal right as a bargaining
chip to be traded for a discount in sentence." Id.
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1. Explicit incentives to plead guilty
In the context of "explicit bargaining" between the defendant and
the prosecutor, the Supreme Court is willing to ignore the clear
chilling effect of a sentencing scheme and focus instead on whether
the defendant made a voluntary plea of guilty.7" In United States v.
Brady,7' the Court upheld a waiver of rights made under the same
sentencing scheme that the Court in Jackson had found to needlessly
encourage waivers of constitutional rights.7 The Court stressed that
Jackson did not determine that the Federal Kidnaping Act was
"inherently coercive."7 - Thus, the Court narrowed the dispute to the
sole question of whether the defendant entered the plea voluntari-
ly.74
The Court in Brady found that the defendant's fear of the death
penalty did not impermissibly coerce him to engage in plea-bargain
negotiations with the prosecutor.75 Furthermore, the Court was
70. SeeUnited Statesv. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,380-84 (1982) (holding thatwhile possibility
exists for vindictiveness in plea bargain process, Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not
extend to charging decisions of prosecutor); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-65
(1978) (finding that prosecutor did not act inappropriately in responding to defendant's refusal
to plead guilty by reindicting defendant under recidivist statute that carried mandatory life
sentence); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-53 (1970) (finding that mere possibility of
higher penalty for crime charged where conviction obtained by trial does not constitute coercion
to plead guilty).
71. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
72. See United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 743-45 (1970) (relating facts of defendant's
indictment under federal kidnaping statute, which provided for death penalty if defendant were
convicted by jury but which provided for life imprisonment if defendant pled guilty). The
United States had charged Brady under the federal kidnaping statute before the Supreme Court
invalidated the death penalty provision in United States v. Jackson. Id. at 743.
73. See id. at 746 (noting that mere fact that federal statute tends to discourage defendants
from exercising right to trial does not mean that all defendants who plead guilty under statute
do so involuntarily) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968)).
74. See id. at 755 (relating that guilty pleas will be deemed voluntary unless induced by
threats or "improper" promises) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1957) (en banc)).
75. See id. at 747 (refusing to rule that all pleas of guilty that are entered out of fear of
possible death sentence are involuntary). The Court noted that the mere encouragement of
guilty pleas is insufficient to render such pleas invalid. See id. at 750 (noting that state
encourages guilty pleas at all stages of criminal process).
The Court indicated, however, that it would hesitate to uphold waivers of rights if empirical
evidence demonstrated that innocent defendants were being persuaded to plead guilty by a
sentencing scheme such as the one utilized in Brady. See id. at 758 (indicating that Court would
have reservations in upholding Brady-type sentencing scheme if, even after receiving advice of
competent counsel, defendants were more likely to plead falsely). See generaly Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1983 (1992) (noting two conflicting
perceptions of plea bargaining- (1) "bargaining convicts too manyinnocents" because defendants
are naturally risk averse and would rather settle than risk sentence after conviction, and (2)
"bargaining convicts toofew innocents" because inherent problems with structure of bargaining
prohibits defendant from settling for least available sentence). The Court in Brady expressed
confidence that trial courts would guard against such occurrences by ensuring that pleas of
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unwilling to invalidate such negotiations because plea bargaining
benefits both the defendant 76 and society.77 The Court argued that
guilty pleas demonstrate a defendant's willingness "to enter the
correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success
in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise
be necessary."78 For society, the Court asserted that the avoidance
of trials conserves scarce resources "for those cases.., in which there
is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.07
2. Implicit incentives to plead guilty
In the context of "implicit bargaining," the Court also has upheld
schemes that encourage waivers of the right to trial by conditioning
leniency on the admission of guilt. In Corbitt v. New Jersey,' the
Court validated a New Jersey statute that offered an inducement to
plead non vult or nolo contendere8s The statute mandated a life
sentence for a defendant convicted by a jury of first degree murder,
but allowed the judge to impose a lower sentence if the defendant
pled non vult or nolo contendere8 2 The defendant argued that the
NewJersey statute interfered with his rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments because it represented a "needless encouragement to
plead guilty or to waive ajury trial."8  The Court asserted, however,
that the New Jersey statute was not necessarily an encouragement
because the sentencing judge retained the discretion to impose the
maximum penalty of life imprisonment in any case.84
guilty were voluntarily and intelligently made. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (expecting courts to
confirm that pleas are "voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with
adequate advice of counsel" and to ensure that there is no doubt as to "accuracy and reliability"
of defendants' confessions). But see Alschuler, supra note 69, at 933 (finding that plea
bargaining transfers judges' power to less experienced prosecutors who lack judges' access to
information and are influenced by partisan nature of their work).
76. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 (listing benefits to defendant as reduction in exposure,
elimination of practical burdens of trial, and expedited entry into correctional process).
77. See id. (recognizing benefit to state in prompt attainment of objectives of punishment
and conservation of scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources).
78. Id. at 753.
79. Id. at 752.
80. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
81. Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
82. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A.113-3 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978-79) (repealed 1979)
(prohibiting guilty pleas for charge of first degree murder but allowing pleas of non vult or nolo
contendere, which carry punishment of either life imprisonment or same punishment as that
required for conviction of second degree murder).
83. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 217 (holding that legislatively imposed sentencing condition was
impermissible because it needlessly encouraged defendant to waive his constitutional rights)
(citing United States v.Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968)).
84. See id. (pointing out that risk of maximum punishment was "not completely avoided"
under statute).
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Furthermore, the Court stated that even if the statute burdened the
defendant's right to trial, "not every burden on the exercise of a
constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to
waive such a right, is invalid."' The majority justified such implicit
burdens on the right to trial on the same policy grounds that Brady
had asserted to buttress explicit plea bargaining:' both the defen-
dant and the State stand to benefit from the entry of guilty pleas.
8 7
The Court reiterated that the defendant who pleads guilty receives
both a reduced sentence and an early start on the road to rehabilita-
tion.a The Court further underscored its belief that plea bargaining
helps the government "conserve vital and scarce resources."8 9
3. Inducement to plead guilty under the federal Sentencing Guidelines
Another legislatively approved implicit bargaining scheme can be
found in section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.' Section
3E1.1 codifies the common-law tradition of allowing judges to
consider a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the purpose of
granting leniency at sentencing.91 The provision permits the judge
to reduce a defendant's sentence upon a showing that the defendant
has accepted responsibility for the crime charged.92 Confession of
guilt is only one of many factors that ajudge may consider in granting
85. Id. at 218. One federal judge has described the Court's approach in Corbitt as "the
rough-and-tumble theory ofjustice." United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761,769 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting in part).
86. SeeUnited States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970) (noting that prevalence of guilty
pleas does not validate system, but recognizing benefit to defendant and society of encouraging
such pleas).
87. Corbit4 439 U.S. at 222.
88. Id. at 222 n.12 (asserting that "properly administered" guilty pleas "can benefit all
concerned") (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)).
89. Id.
90. U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3El.1.
91. SeeUnited States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761,767-68 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski,J., dissenting
in part) (noting that § 3El.1 reflects "hoary tradition" allowing judge to factor admissions of
guilt into sentencing determinations); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1012 (11th Cir.
1989) (finding that § 3El.1 clarifies common-law sentencing leniency by providing defendants
with better warning of consequences of their choices); see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 28-29
(1988) (noting that § 3E1.1 reflects past sentencing practice of reducing defendant's sentence
by 30-40% for pleading guilty without explicitly telling defendant that guilty plea guarantees
lower sentence or that election ofjury trial guarantees higher sentence).
92. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3El. (a) (providing for two-level reduction in offense if
defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for offense); id. § 3E1.1(b)
(providing additional one-level reduction if defendant has offense level of 16 or greater and
defendant has "assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by
taking one or more of the following steps: (1) timely providing complete information to the
government concerning his own involvement in the offense; or (2) timely notifying authorities
of his intention to enter a plea of guilty").
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a sentence reduction. 9-
Section E.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines resembles the New
Jersey statute that the Court upheld in Corbitt in that both provisions
may encourage a defendant to waive his right to trial.94 Section
3E.1, like the New Jersey statute, also allows the judge to reduce a
defendant's sentence for pleading guilty." Furthermore, neither
provision guarantees that a guilty plea will result in a lower sen-
tence96 and give broad discretion to the sentencing judge.9"
While the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the Guidelines
93. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3El.1, comment. (n.1). The commentary to § 3El.1 lists,
nonexclusively, the following factors appropriate to consider when determining whether the
defendant has demonstrated clear acceptance of responsibility for the offense:
(a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and
truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which
the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) ... ;
(b) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations;
(c) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt;
(d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commission of the offense;
(e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities
of the offense;
(f) voluntary resignation from the office or position held during the commission of the
offense;
(g) post-offense rehabilitative efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment); and
(h) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the acceptance of
responsibility.
Id.
The circuits are split over whetherjudges may grant sentencing reductions to defendants who
plead guilty but deny admitting participation in criminal acts. Compare United States v. Tucker,
925 F.2d 990, 992-93 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that defendant's admission of guilt while
maintaining innocence does not preclude reduction for acceptance of responsibility) with United
States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026, 1037 (2d Cir.) (finding that defendant who pled guilty but stated
that "I will go to my grave saying I did nothing wrong" was not entitled to two-point reduction
for acceptance of responsibility), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991).
94. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978) (holding as constitutional New
Jersey statute that encouraged defendant to waive right to trial); United States v. Cordell, 924
F.2d 614, 619 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that § 3El.1 burdens exercise of right to trial in
order to encourage pleas of guilty).
95. Compare U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3EL.1 (a) (providing for two-level reduction in base-
level offense if defendant demonstrates acceptance of responsibility) and U.S.S.G., supra note
9, § 3E1.1(b) (providing additional one-level reduction if defendant's offense level is 16 or
greater and defendant assists prosecution by entering guilty plea) with NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A-l 1-3
(West 1969 & Supp. 1978-79) (repealed 1979) (providing that ifjudge accepts plea of non vult
or nolo contendere to charge of murder in first degree, punishment shall be either imprisonment
for life or 30 years, but if defendant is convicted by jury, punishment shall be life imprison-
ment).
96. Compare Corbit, 439 U.S. at 226 (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing that under New
Jersey statute defendant can be sentenced to maximum penalty whether she pleads non vu/i or
goes to trial) with U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1, comment. (n.3) ("A defendant who enters a
guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under this section as a matter of right.").
97. Compare Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 222 (finding that provisions of NewJersey statute that allow
judge to accept or reject plea of non vult and to impose life in prison or term of years vest
discretion in trial judge) with U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1, comment. (n.5) ("The sentencing
judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this
reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.").
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in general, the Court has never had occasion to rule on the constitu-
tionality of section 3E1.1.98 The courts of appeals that have ad-
dressed the issue have unanimously rejected challenges to the facial
constitutionality, on either Fifth or Sixth Amendment grounds, of
section 3E.1. 9 One court, however, has found that section 3E1.1
may be applied in an unconstitutional manner.100 In United States
v. Watt,'0' the Ninth Circuit held that a sentencing court may not
consider any exercise of a constitutional right to the defendant's
detriment.1
0 2
Despite the Ninth Circuit's emphatic statement in Watt, there are
at least two problems in ascertaining when ajudge has unconstitution-
ally considered the exercise of a constitutional right against a
defendant. First, section 3E1.1 clearly allows judges to count, as
positive evidence in the defendant's favor, the waiver of the right to
trial.1' The consideration of such positive evidence at sentencing,
though, may not be a sufficient inducement for a defendant to plead
guilty.104  Given the important policy goals underlying implicit
bargaining,105 a question then arises as to why a judge may not
98. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding Sentencing
Guidelines on nondelegation and separation of powers grounds); Dokla, supra note 34, at 1083
n.19 (noting that Supreme Court has yet to address constitutionality of§ 3El.l); Eskridge, supra
note 9, at 685 (relating that Mistretta declined to consider constitutionality of individual
Sentencing Guidelines provisions).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362-63 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
approach embodied in § 3E1.1 does not constitute per se policy of punishing those who stand
trial, even though leniency is more commonly granted to defendants who plead guilty), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1026 (1993); United States v. Cordell, 924 F.2d 614, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that § 3E1.1 is constitutional on its face); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018,
1020-21 (9th Cir. 1990) (asserting that § 3E1.1 does not infringe on defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights by encouraging defendant to incriminate himself and waive jury trial to
obtain benefit of reduction); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (11th Cir. 1989)
(holding that § 3E1.1 may add to defendant's dilemmas but provision was not intended to
punish defendant for exercising rights).
One commentator argues that § 3El.l's two-point reduction is too low to constitute an
unconstitutional inducement to plead guilty. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as
Compromise, 101 YALE LJ. 1969, 1977-78 (1992) (stating that reduction under § 3E1.1 is
historically less than pre-Guidelines reduction for acceptance of responsibility). But see Capra,
supra note 29, at 3 (asserting that reduction can result in substantially shorter sentence).
100. See United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that court had
applied § 3E1.1 in violation of Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause because it had
considered defendant's failure to assist in recovery of fruits and instrumentalities of crime to be
incriminatory).
101. 910 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1990).
102. United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1990).
108. U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1; see Henry, 883 F.2d at 1012 (maintaining that § 3E1.1
formalizes tradition of granting leniency to defendants who manifest acceptance of responsibility
by admitting guilt).
104. Cf. Karle & Sager, supra note 1, at 404 (predicting decrease in plea bargaining due to
lack of incentives to plea bargain under Sentencing Guidelines).
105. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (relating policy behind encouragement of
guilty pleas).
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count the exercise of a constitutional right against a defendant.
Second, if a judge may consider the exercise of a constitutional
right against a defendant, yet another query arises as to whether it
matters if the judge characterizes the sentencing differential as a
denial of a benefit available under the Guidelines or an enhancement
of the defendant's sentence.06 The case law reveals no clear line
with which to distinguish between the denial of a benefit for failure
to waive rights and the imposition of a penalty for exercising the same
rights.' Although courts on the whole have refused to prohibit
denials of the benefit of a sentencing reduction in the same way that
they have prohibited enhancements of sentences,"8 certain cases
suggest that such denials of benefits are per se prohibited1" as
106. Cf. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 n.4 (1980) (questioning whether
"principled distinction" may be drawn between denial of benefit and imposition of penalty).
107. Compare United States v. Klotz, 943 F.2d 707, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing
problems distinguishing rewards from penalties in context of sentencing) with United States v.
Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1992) (asserting that sentencing judge must distinguish
between rewarding for demonstration of contrition and penalty for exercising constitutional
right) (citing United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 113 S. CL
478, and cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1306 (1993).
The court in Kl0tz noted that a sentencing judge's denial of the benefit of a reduction may
"be read.., to signify a penalty for silence," or "it also could mean that the judge found [the
defendant] a callous person, unconcerned about the injuries he inflicted on others." Klotz, 943
F.2d at 711. The court concluded that it would "fetter judges unduly" to require them to
explain all sentencing decisions in terms "unambiguously neutral with respect to all
constitutional rights." Id. The court in Sitton, however, argued that the danger that the trial
court may consider the defendant's exercise of a constitutionally protected right against the
defendant requires that the judge affirmatively state, on the record, the reasons for denying the
benefit of a sentence reduction. See Sitton, 968 F.2d at 962-63 (remanding to district court for
more detailed explanation of reasons for denying sentence reduction).
108. See United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding "well
established" rule that defendant may not be subjected to more severe punishment for exercising
constitutionally protected right, but refusing to find corollary that show of leniency toward
defendants who plead guilty constitutes policy of penalizing those who stand trial); United States
v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (refusing to equate possibility of leniency with
unconstitutional punishment).
109. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973) (holding that New York statute
violated plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights by denying contractors' privilege of contracting with
state for period of five years if contractors refused to testify without immunity).
The decision in Turley is similar to other cases in which the Court has recognized that
conditioning benefits on the waiver of rights can rise to the level of compulsion. See, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984) (suggesting that if state conditioned benefit of
remaining free on parole on waiver of Fifth Amendment freedom from compelled self-
incrimination, such condition would be unconstitutional); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S.
801, 807 (1977) (ruling that state could not condition benefit of holding public office on waiver
of immunity from prosecution); Garrityv. NewJersey, 385 U.S. 493,497-98 (1967) (finding that
statute requiring defendant to forfeitjob or waive Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination exerted such pressure as to prevent person from making free choice).
Elsewhere, though, the Court has indicated that it is difficult to draw a "principled distinction"
between a condition of benefit and a punishment. See Roberts, 445 U.S. at 557 n.4 (asserting
difficulty of distinguishing between enhancement of punishment and denial of leniency). The
inability of the Court to draw a principled distinction is due primarily to the fact that the Court
has 'never developed a coherent rationale for determining when ... offers [of conditioned
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unconstitutional conditions.' Indeed, one circuit has ruled a
sentence void where the benefit was denied simply because a
defendant did not plead guilty."'
The advent of fixed sentences under the Guidelines appears to
make distinguishing among rewards, penalties, and denials of benefits
easier than in the pre-Guidelines environment where each sentence
was left entirely to the discretion of the trial judge."2 Although the
Guidelines specify a range of permissible sentences for each offense,
determining what is a "normal" sentence is still problematic. One
circuit has concluded that the presumptive range is itself the
norm.1
3
Treating the permissible range as the norm, however, is problemat-
ic because of the broad discretion that federal judges have to arrive
at a sentence within that range." 4 Indeed, judges may consider any
information about a defendant that is not prohibited by law.' 5 Due
to the uncertainty over when consideration by the sentencing judge
of the exercise of the right to trial rises to the level of infringing on
a constitutional right,"6 it is difficult to ascertain when a judge has
benefits] rise to the level of coercion." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1428 (1989); see also Howard E. Abrams, Systemic Coercion: Unconstitutional
Conditions in the Criminal Law, 72J. CUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128, 155-64 (1981) (arguing that
Supreme Court should recognize that while threats made in plea bargain context may not
penalize defendants who insist on exercising rights, they may "induce waivers favorable to the
state by rewarding those who forego their entitlements").
110. SeeSullivan, supra note 109, at 1415 ("The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds
that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government maywithhold that benefit altogether."). ButseeCass
R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 344-45
(1989) (asserting that unconstitutional conditions doctrine is "awkward and crude" effort to
scrutinize measures that burden constitutional rights and obscures analysis ofjustifications state
may have for burdening rights).
111. United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that district court
may not deny reduction because of choice to remain silent or to proceed to trial where there
are "other manifestations of sincere contrition"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 478, and cert. denied; 113
S. Ct. 1306 (1993).
112. See United Statesv. Klotz, 943 F.2d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that pre-Guidelines
sentencing was "so individualistic" as to make it "next to impossible to tell" when judges
considered exercise of constitutional right).
113. See id. at 710-11 (rejecting claim that lower limit of range or even midpoint should be
benchmark for determining rewards and penalties).
114. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 1B1.4 (stating that within Guidelines range judge may
"consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law").
115. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 1B1.4 (declaring that race, sex, national origin, creed,
religion, and socio-economic status are not relevant in determining sentence and are prohibited
by law).
116. Compare United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (identifying
tradition of bestowing leniency on defendants who admit guilt) with United States v. Watt, 910
F.2d 587,592-93 (9th Cir. 1990) (asserting that court may not consider constitutionally protected
conduct against defendant).
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impermissibly weighed a decision to go to trial in fixing a sentence
within a range. Furthermore, unless the judge is explicit about how
he arrives at the final sentence, it is difficult to determine whether the
judge has denied a benefit or exacted a penalty for the defendant's
exercise of the right to trial."'
The difficulties inherent in distinguishing a denial of a benefit from
a punitive sentence enhancement provided an opportunity for the
trial judge in United States v. Jones to adjust the defendant's sentence
solely because the defendant went to trial."8 They also enabled the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to render two separate
opinions offering widely different interpretations as to whether the
adjustment constituted a denial of a benefit or an enhanced sen-
tence.n 9
II. UNTE STATES V. JONES
A. Facts of the Case
On the morning of May 2, 1990, Thomas T. Jones stepped off a
Greyhound bus in Washington, D.C. and a plainclothes detective
asked Jones to identify himself. 21 Jones replied that his identifica-
tion was on the bus and offered to retrieve it.'2 1 Instead of getting
back on the bus, however, Jones fled on foot.122  Police officers
apprehended him shortly thereafter.' 23  Meanwhile, the bus passen-
gers had claimed all the luggage on the bus except for a green tote
bag, which Jones denied owning. 24 A search of the bag's contents
revealed an airline ticket withJones' name on it and a bag containing
cocaine.'
A grand jury indicted Jones on one count of unlawful possession
with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base in
117. For example, judges may surreptitiously establish either a low benchmark within the
range from which they can enhance a sentence for exercising the right to trial or a high
benchmark within the range from which they can deny the benefit of a reduction for failure to
accept responsibility by pleading guilty. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 n.4 (1980);
cf United States v. Klotz, 943 F.2d 707,710 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that entire sentencing range
is starting point, and reasons for deviations up or down are not easily shown).
118. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (relating judge's sentencing order).
119. Compare United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (characterizing
judge's order as acceptable enhancement of sentence) with United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d
1475, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc) (characterizingjudge's order as acceptable denial of full
benefit available under Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility).
120. Jones, 973 F.2d at 929.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) 126 and 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii),127 which
carry a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years in prison.128
Before the trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
the defendant attempted to enter into plea negotiations with the
prosecutor.199 The government, however, refused to entertain any
plea bargain,"s° and the jury found Jones guilty.1 ' District Court
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered a presentence report and
scheduled a date for sentencing. 3
2
Judge Jackson, applying the Sentencing Guidelines, calculated that
the defendant's base offense level was thirty-four."3 This level,
combined with a criminal history score of one,M established a
sentencing range of 151 to 188 months. 5 A full two-level credit for
acceptance of responsibility 6 would have reduced the base sen-
126. Appellant's Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 2, United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3025), afI'd 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied 126 L. Ed.
2d 704 (1994). Section 841(a) specifies:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense,
a counterfeit substance.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988).
127. Appellant's Brief at 2, Jones (No. 91-3025). Section 841(b) specifies the penalties for
violating subsection (a) where the defendant is accused of possession of "50 grams or more of
a mixture or substance," 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii) (1988), "containing a detectable amount
of cocaine." Id. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (ii). These penalties include "imprisonment which may not be
less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of
such substance shall not be less than 20 years or more than life." Id. § 841(b) (1988).
128. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1988).
129. Appellant's Brief at 3, Jones (No. 91-3025).
130. See id. ("Each time [defendant] was informed [by the government] that he could plead
guilty to the indictment... [defendant] respectfully declined those 'offers."). Under the Bush
administration, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh instructed individual U.S. Attorneys to
avoid plea bargaining. SeeMemorandum from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to Federal
Prosecutors 3 (Mar. 13, 1989) (stating that "charges are not to be bargained away or dropped,
unless the prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government's ability to prove a charge
for legal or evidentiary reasons"); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Appellant at 6,
United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3025) (noting policy of U.S.
Attorneys to refuse to plea bargain), afid, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), crt. denied,
126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
131. Appellant's Brief at 1,Jones (No. 91-3025).
132. Id. at 3 (asserting that defendant cooperated with presentence report writer).
133. United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 928,932 (D.C. Cir. 1992), af'd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (en banc), cert. denie, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994); seeU.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 2D1.1 (a) (3)
(establishing offense levels according to drug quantity).
134. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 4A1.1 (setting forth specific factors to be considered in
determining criminal history).
135. U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 5A tbl.
136. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1 (a) (allowing two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility).
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tence to 121 months. 7 Judge Jackson, however, questioned
whether the defendant was entitled to the full credit." The judge
ruled that the defendant's admission of guilt after trial constituted a
"rather meager basis"3 9 upon which to give a full benefit. He
therefore imposed a sentence of 127 months, six months longer than
the sentence that would have been proper had he awarded the full
credit available for acceptance of responsibility" ° The judge cited
the defendant's decision to go to trial as the sole reason for imposing
the additional six-month sentence.'
The defendant appealed both the conviction and the sentence. 4 2
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously
upheld the conviction 43 and upheld the sentence by a vote of two
to one.'" The panel characterized the six months as an extra term
for going to trial45 and held that a defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights are not violated where a federal judge imposes an
enhanced sentence solely because the defendant elected trial over a
137. U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 5A tbl.
138. Sentencing Transcript at 2-3, United States v. Jones, No. 90-240 (D.D.C. 1991).
139. Id. at 2.
140. See id. at 13 (indicating judge's discomfort with imposing minimum sentence because
defendant who pled guilty could receive same sentence).
141. Id. At sentencingJudge Jackson explained the imposition of the additional six-month
sentence:
I do think that there is some premium that should be recognized for pleading guilty
in advance of trial rather than taking a case to trial in which the defendant knows that
he is guilty and he is properly charged and there is no defense to it.
I do, however, think that in the circumstances, I intend to give Mr. Jones a major
portion of the benefit that he derives from his acceptance of responsibility.
I would, had this case been disposed of with a plea in advance of trial, have
sentenced him at the very bottom of the guidelines and imposed the minimum
sentence that I could possibly have imposed.
Because, however, the case did go to trial, I am going to add an additional six
months to the guideline sentence that I intend to impose, and will impose a sentence
of 127 months.
I am articulating this so that anybody that wishes to take it to the sentencing
commission and/or the court of appeals may do so. I would like to have some thought
given to the considerations I've articulated today. And I would like to know whether
or not there is some constitutional error I commit by recognizing that the case was
taken to trial, albeit a matter of constitutional right to take the case to trial, rather than
acknowledging in advance the guilt that was obviously supported by the proof.
Id. at 12-13.
142. United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 928,929 (D.C. Cir. 1992), afld, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (en banc), cert. denieA, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
143. See id. at 930-31 (dismissing defendant's claims that district court erred in failing to find
illegal search or seizure).
144. See id. at 932-38 (detailing grounds for upholding sentencing order). But sm id. at 940
(Mikva, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing majority's reasons for
affirming sentence as unpersuasive).
145. See id. at 932-38 (detailing rationale for upholding sentencing judge's imposition of
additional six months).
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guilty plea." The defendant argued that the additional six-month
sentence violated his due process rights by punishing him for
exercising his right to trial,147 but the panel found "no constitution-
al obstacle to the extra time." 48 The panel reasoned that the
judge's order was constitutional, given the tension between Supreme
Court cases that prohibit the chilling of a defendant's decision to go
to trial and those that allow the government to create sentencing
schemes that induce defendants to plead guilty. 49 The panel also
found support in decisions upholding the constitutionality of the
Sentencing Guidelines' acceptance-of-responsibility provision. 50
Furthermore, the panel reasoned that the judge's sentencing order
served the important policy goal of reducing the burden on federal
judges through the encouragement of plea bargaining.'51
The D.C. Circuit subsequently granted the defendant's motion for
rehearing on the question of the sentence imposed. 152 On rehear-
ing, the en banc court affirmed the sentence in a seven to four
decision, but did so on narrower grounds.15 Whereas the panel
had viewed the six-month sentence as an enhancement for failure to
plead guilty, the en banc court characterized the sentence as a denial
of the full benefit allowed under the Guidelines. 154  The court
determined that such a denial was permitted, reasoning that granting
leniency to defendants who plead guilty requires withholding leniency
from those who do not.5 5 The court also found support in the
commentary to the 1990 version of section 3E1.1, which advised a
judge to refuse the two-point sentence reduction where a defendant
does not plead guilty.56 Finally, the court upheld the sentence on
the grounds that it was well below the minimum sentencing range for
the defendant's offense.
57
Although each court affirmed the sentence, the panel and en banc
146. See id. at 933 (finding extra time permissible under Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text (discussing panel's analysis of Supreme
Court precedent).
150. Jones, 973 F.2d at 937.
151. Id. at 938.
152. United States v.Jones, 980 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
153. United States v.Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied 126
L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
154. See id. (concluding that judge was justified in giving defendant "less of a benefit than
he would have allowed an otherwise identical defendant who showed greater acceptance of
responsibility by acknowledging his guilt at an earlier stage").
155. Id. at 1477-78.
156. Id. at 1478.
157. Id. at 1479.
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decisions reflect widely differing interpretations of whether the trial
judge's order denied a benefit or enhanced a sentence. 158  An
examination of each decision is necessary in order to ascertain
whether this distinction makes any constitutional difference.
Ultimately, it is evident that the denial of benefit/sentence enhance-
ment distinction is a red herring.'59 For constitutional purposes,
the more important distinction is that between weighing the exercise
of the right to trial as the sole evidence against a defendant and
counting the waiver of the same right as evidence in the defendant's
favor.1 o
B. The Panel Opinion
1. The judge's order as a sentence enhancement
The panel that first considered the defendant's appeal character-
ized the six-month sentence differential as an enhancement based on
the exercise of the right to trial.161  Indeed, the notion that the
sentence was an enhancement is fully supported by the record. The
sentencing transcript indicates that the judge explicitly tied the
defendant's decision to go to trial to the additional six months. 62
Judge Jackson stated that "because... the case did go to trial, I am
going to add an additional six months to the Guideline sentence."' 63
The characterization of the sentencing order as an enhancement
for going to trial, however, raised nettlesome constitutional questions
for the panel. A two-member majority of the panel addressed these
questions and found that differential sentencing, even with its
concomitant burden on the right to trial, is necessary to preserve
judicial resources through the encouragement of plea bargaining.,
158. See id, at 1489 (Sentelle,J., dissenting) (suggesting that case should be remanded to trial
judge for clarification given large difference between panel and en banc court's interpretations
of record below).
159. See Jones, 997 F.2d at 1483 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting) (asserting that whether judge was
enhancing punishment or denying leniency probably did not matter).
160. See id. at 1484 (Wald,J., dissenting) (acknowledging that dividing line between allowing
weighing of waiver of right to trial as evidence in defendant's favor and prohibiting counting
exercise of right to trial against defendant "may seem exquisitely refined, but it has nonetheless
endured in our jurisprudence").
161. See United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 928,933 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (characterizing six-month
sentence as "extra time"), af'd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed.
2d 704 (1994).
162. Cf A Penalty for Going to Trial?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at 1, 26 (quoting Marc
Miller, co-editor of Federal Sentencing Reporter, as stating that he had never "heard of ajudge
making the link so clearly").
163. Sentencing Transcript at 13, United States v.Jones, No. 90-240 (D.D.C.Jan. 24, 1991).
164. Jones, 973 F.2d at 938.
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2. Tension among Supreme Court cases
In addressing the constitutional questions, the panel first identified
what it believed to be a tension among Supreme Court precedent on
sentencing differentials. 1" To demonstrate this tension, the panel
juxtaposed the line of cases "seem[ing] to draw in question any
sentencing practice that disfavored the decision to go to trial " "
with later cases that "establish that in many contexts the government
(state or federal) may impose sentencing differentials that favor
defendants who plead guilty over those who go to trial." 67
The panel presented United States v. Jackson," North Carolina v.
Pearce,69 and Blackledge v. Perry7° as three opinions that seemed
to restrict government-sponsored inducement of guilty pleas. 7' The
panel initially considered dismissing Jackson on a number of grounds
relating to the especially difficult choice that the defendant in that
case had to make regarding whether to risk the death penalty by
electing a jury trial. 7 2  The panel acknowledged, however, that it
could not dismiss Jackson because Pearce "speaks more broadly"73 in
its prohibition against "vindictiveness."74 It further noted that
Blackledge seemed to equate vindictiveness with any desire to discour-
age the defendant from going to trial. 5
The panel then contrasted this seemingly broad prohibition against
deterring the exercise of the right to trial with the later cases of Brady
v. United States,7 ' Bordenkircher v. Hayes,'" and Corbitt v. New Jer-
165. See id. at 935 (stating that Supreme Court has recognized "mingling of legitimate and
illegitimate" purposes in sentencing practices).
166. Id. at 933.
167. Id.
168. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
169. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
170. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
171. Jones, 973 F.2d at 938. See generally supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text (providing
background on line of cases supporting notion that state may not deter defendant from
exercising constitutional rights).
172. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 933 (suggesting that one might dismiss Jackson because of
"excruciating" choice presented by death penalty, "perceived disproportion" of consequences
of going to trial as opposed to pleading guilty, or by "implausibility" of government's argument
that rule lessened seriousness of punishment).
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing United States v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,725 (1969)). The court suggested that
Pearce is broader because it established the rule that imposing a higher sentence on remand than
that which the defendant successfully challenged at trial raises a presumption of vindictiveness.
Id.
175. See id. (noting that Supreme Court did not explicitly define vindictiveness in Blackledge)
(citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974)).
176. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
177. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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sey178 that permitted the state to provide a benefit to a defendant
who pleads guilty in advance of trial.'79 Through these cases, the
panel maintained, the Supreme Court had both implicitly"a and
explicitly 8' endorsed sentencing schemes that encourage waiver of
the right to trial. The panel concluded that, in order to reconcile the
tension in the Supreme Court precedent, it is impossible to declare
every practice that discourages the right to trial or appeal unconstitu-
tional.'82 The panel argued that the Supreme Court itself had
reconciled these cases by restricting the factual circumstances under
which the Court would presume vindictiveness 8 ' and by adopting
a narrow definition of what constitutes vindictiveness. 84
For three reasons noted in a strongly worded dissent by Chief Judge
Mikva, the majority's portrayal of tension in constitutional case law is
a contrived attempt to support its conclusion thatjudges may impose
a penalty on defendants who choose to stand trial. 85 First, no other
court has detected this tension in Supreme Court precedent.
86
Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly denied the existence of any
tension when it asserted that the prohibition on punishing a
defendant for exercising a legal right is a principle originating "with
178. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
179. See supranotes 62-119 and accompanying text (discussing line of cases that permits some
burdening of constitutional right to trial).
180. See United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (asserting that Brady
demonstrates implicit acceptance of sentencing schemes that favor pleas of guilty) (citing Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)), afftd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert.
denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
181. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 934 (asserting that Corbitt demonstrates explicit acceptance of
sentencing schemes that favor pleas of guilty) (citing Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-23
(1978)).
The panel noted that a crucial component in the constitutional underpinning of the
sentencing scheme in Corbitt was the uncertainty that the defendant faced in making his or her
decision to plead guilty. See Jaes, 973 F.2d at 934 (relating that, under New Jersey statute
addressed in Corbitt, even defendant who pleads guilty could be given maximum sentence while
defendant who goes to trial might be convicted of lesser-included offense or even acquitted)
(citing Corbit 439 U.S. at 226-27 (Stewart,J., concurring)). The court in Jones, though, argued
that such uncertainty was also present in the instant case by noting that defendants who stand
trial always have the possibility of being acquitted. Jones, 973 F.2d at 934.
182. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 932 (stating that, although Jackson, Pearce, and Black/edge may
suggest that practices deterring exercise of right to trial or appeal are prohibited, such reading
is inconsistent with Bordenkircher and Corbitt).
183. See id. at 934 (citing Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801-02 (1989) for proposition that
presumption of vindictiveness should not apply where sentence is higher after trial than
sentence issued after guilty plea because of inference that higher trial sentence may result
naturally from information gathered at trial).
184. See id. at 935 (suggesting that Court has settled on definition of vindictiveness that refers
to personal inconvenience or loss of face, not concern over burden on court's resources).
185. See id. at 939 (Mikva, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that district
judge had added six months "simply to raise the question that my colleagues leap to decide").
186. See id. at 940 (Mikva, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
"Supreme Court and every other circuit" have emphasized consistency).
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North Carolina v. Pearce and culminating in Bordenkircher v. Hayes."87
Second, any apparent inconsistency most likely stems from the
panel's overly broad reading of constitutional precedent. 8 8 In fact,
the holdings of Pearce and Blackledge were "far narrower" 89 than the
panel suggested.1 90 The holding of Pearce was limited to the danger
of retaliation by a judge during sentencing.91  Moreover, the Court
in Blackledge focused its decision on the potential for prosecutorial
vindictiveness after trial.1 92 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself distin-
guished these two cases in Bordenkircher, where it allowed a prosecutor
to threaten the defendant with a more serious charge during plea
bargaining.9 3 Rejecting an application of Pearce and Blackledge, the
Court in Bordenkircher stated that these cases dealt with "the State's
unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen to
exercise a legal right-a situation 'very different from the give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining."'194
Third, the panel opinion failed to recognize the Supreme Court's
distinctions between the roles of the judge, the prosecutor, and the
legislature. 95 The court ignored the distinct role of the judge even
though the Supreme Court had expressly noted in Pearce that the
judge has tremendous power to influence a defendant's decision to
exercise his or her constitutional rights. 6 In announcing its test of
"vindictiveness," the Court in Pearce did not weigh, as the panel did,
society's interests in combating crime against the preservation of the
defendant's due process rights. 97  In Pearce, the Supreme Court
187. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982).
188. Jones, 973 F.2d at 940 (Mikva, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id.
190. Id. (disputing assertion that Pearce and Blackledge "suggest that all practices tending to
deter the exercise of a right to trial or appeal... constitute forbidden vindictiveness").
191. SeeNorth Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) (requiring that sentence handed
down after retrial must be untouched by any vindictiveness judge has due to defendant's
successful attack of first conviction).
192. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (noting interest that prosecutors have
in "discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo"
because appeals drain prosecutorial resources and new trials may result in reversals).
193. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (disfavoring "rigid constitutional
rule" that would restrict prosecutor's dealings with defense counsel).
194. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970)) (emphasis
added).
195. See id. at 363-64 (noting discretion of prosecutor regarding charges filed, limited by both
Constitution and legislators' definition of chargeable offenses).
196. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (declaring that court may not use its sentencing power to put
defendants in position of making "unfree" choices) (quoting Worchester v. Commissioner, 370
F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966)); see also id. at 725 n.20 (acknowledging defendant's fear that, on
reconviction, sentencing judge might impose greater sentence in retaliation for accused's
exercise of constitutional right).
197. Compare Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725-26 (declaring that due process requires that vindictive-
ness "play no part" in sentence defendant receives after new trial) with United States v. Jones,
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firmly held judges to a higher standard by declaring that their
discretion at sentencing must be limited by respect for the
defendant's constitutional rights." 8
As the dissent notes, the panel opinion in Jones also failed to
distinguish between judges and prosecutors." While prosecutors
possess broad latitude to offer inducements to plead guilty2 judges
are prohibited from doing so because the court may not participate
in any plea negotiations.2"' The rationale behind this rule is that,
were a judge allowed to participate, a defendant may have justifiable
concerns that she would not receive a fair trial, especially if she
declined to accept the judge's plea offer.02
973 F.2d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that interest in conserving judicial resources
"requires" that judge engage in differential sentencing), affd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(en banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
198. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (refusing to give court right to put "price on an appeal")
(quoting Worchester, 370 F.2d at 718).
199. Jones, 973 F.2d at 940 (Mikva, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that Supreme Court has carefully distinguished state actors and "differing contexts in which they
act," and Court's decisions are based on distinction between prosecutors and judge because they
play different roles in area of punishment).
200. SeeBordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (refusing to find vindictiveness in
context of "give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and
defense"); Appellant's Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 8, United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3025) (arguing that Supreme Court places considerable weight on
defendant's ability to make free decisions before trial as reason for giving prosecutors broad
latitude), affd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
Indeed, the only time the Court has restricted a prosecutorial inducement was in an instance
where the prosecutor demonstrated the same kind of post-trial vindictiveness exhibited by the
trial judge in Pearce See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (holding that prosecutor
acted vindictively in securing felony indictment based on same evidence that originally gave rise
to misdemeanor charge after defendant had been convicted on misdemeanor charge and chose
to exercise right to trial de novo).
In contrast, if the prosecutor were to display such conduct before the defendant entered a
plea, then there would likely be no constitutional infringement. See United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1982) (holding that need for prosecutor to remain free to exercise broad
discretion before trial allowed prosecutor to obtain felony indictment after defendant refused
to plead guilty to misdemeanor charges).
201. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e) (1) ("The court shall not participate in any [plea] discussions.").
202. See United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 556-58 (9th Cir. 1992) (vacating guilty plea
where judge participated in discussion and negotiation of plea agreement). In Bruce, the court
set forth three reasons for announcing a per se prohibition on judicial involvement in plea
bargaining. See id. (discussing "bright-line rule" of FED. R. CLUM. P. 11 (e)(1)). First, the court
argued that such participation "carries with it the high and unacceptable risk of coercing a
defendant to accept the proposed agreement and plead guilty." Id. at 556. Second, the court
noted that Rule 11 "protect[s] the integrity of thejudicial process," by protecting the role of the
judge as neutral arbiter rather than adversary. Id. Third, the court asserted that judicial
involvement in plea bargaining taints the post-plea negotiation process by making it difficult for
judges to assess the voluntariness of pleas, maintain impartiality at trial, and remain objective
in "post trial matters such as sentencing." Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
In State v. Cross, 240 S.E.2d 514, 516 (S.C. 1977) (reversing and remanding to allow
defendant to withdraw guilty pleas when trial judge was found to have coerced defendant into
pre-trial plea bargaining), the South Carolina Supreme Court emphasized the neutral role of
the judge:
[T]he judge should not initiate or influence the agreement, nor be a party to the
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Finally, the panel did not recognize the distinction between a
Corbitt-style, legislatively created sentencing scheme and a judicially
imposed scheme."' The fact that the scheme in Corbitt was of
legislative origin is crucial to its constitutionality because the origin of
the law made it difficult for the Supreme Court to find any "element
of retaliation or vindictiveness"" 4 toward the defendant personal-
ly2 5 Furthermore, under a legislative scheme, the defendant has
the opportunity to obtain counseling about the opportunities and
risks inherent in the law. 6 In Jones, however, the defendant had no
choices available to him because the prosecutor refused to plea
bargain 20 7 and the judge imposed his own sentencing scheme after
trial.208
3. Staleness of circuit court precedent prohibiting unilateral judicial
action
The panel also refused to follow the precedent of its own cir-
cuit,2 as well as that of other circuits, prohibiting a judge from
negotiations. A plea induced by the influence of the judge cannot be said to have
been voluntarily entered. The solicitor is the adversary of the defendant and his
counsel. The negotiations should be between the adversaries. The judge is not the
adversary of either. An agreement reached between the solicitor and his adversary can
never be more than a recommendation. The judge must remain in a position of complete
neutrality such that he may, in the last analysis, exercise freedom of sentencing judgment based
on all of the facts.
Id. at 516-17 (emphasis added).
203. United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Mikva, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (asserting that legislature may encourage guilty pleas by offering
benefits but that Corbitt does not stand for proposition that trial judge may unilaterally offer
same benefits), aff'4 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704
(1994).
204. Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978).
205. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 943 (Mikva, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that fact that legislatures are less likely to manifest vindictiveness toward individual
defendants dispels notion that tension exists between Pearce and Corbitt). The dissent also
maintained that the lack of vindictiveness on the part of legislatures supports a finding that the
Sentencing Guidelines' reduction for acceptance of responsibility is constitutional. See id.
(distinguishing congressionally sanctioned passage of acceptance-of-responsibility provision of
Sentencing Guidelines from unilateral action on part of sentencingjudge).
206. See Corbit; 439 U.S. at 225 (finding no indication that defendant "was notwell counseled
or that he misunderstood the choices that were placed before him"); see also Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (declaring that state does not encroach on defendant's due
process rights as long as "accused is free to accept or reject" prosecution's offer).
207. Jones, 973 F.2d at 932 (contending that government's refusal to plea bargain limited
defendant's choices but concluding that this did not prevent defendant from pleading guilty).
208. See Appellant's Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 9, United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 928
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3025) (arguing that Supreme Court's plea bargaining cases do not
apply because defendant was not afforded opportunity to make informed choice prior to trial),
afTd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
209. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (announcing rule barring
trial judge from encouraging guilty pleas by policy of differential sentencing because it affects
defendant's decision to exercise right to trial). But seeJones, 973 F.2d at 936 (finding that Scotes
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unilaterally increasing a sentence because a defendant decided to go
to trial.21° Every circuit that has addressed this issue has concluded
that such sentence enhancements violate due process.211  Neverthe-
less, the panel discounted the contrary precedent on the basis that
these decisions either predated 2 2 or else failed to consider Supreme
Court opinions allowing the state to encourage waivers of the right to
trial.213
While the panel claimed that it could dismiss the contrary circuit
court decisions because they either predated or ignored the relevant
Supreme Court developments, at least two of these "developments"
actually appear in earlier cases on sentencing differentials. First, the
panel gave considerable weight to Corbitt's "explicit" acceptance of the
idea that the state may create schemes that favor guilty pleas.214
ban on any judicial inducement of guilty pleas is inconsistent with Supreme Court's suggestion
in Blackledge that prosecutor and judge can be equally vindictive).
210. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 935-36 (disregarding "relevant precedent" in circuit because it
predated "important Supreme Court cases on differential sentencing" and ignoring cases in
other circuits that "predate the critical Supreme Court developments" or 'rely on outdated
precedents" without considering relevant Court developments).
211. See id. at 939 (Mikva, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing long line
of cases that have found judge-imposed sentence enhancements unconstitutional where
defendant exercised right to trial rather than plead guilty); see, e.g., United States v. Mazzaferro,
865 F.2d 450, 460 (1st Cir. 1989) (declaring that law is clear thatjudge may not retaliate against
defendant for exercising right to stand trial); United States v. Hutchings, 757 F.2d 11, 14 (2d
Cir.) (finding trial court's issuance of increased sentence based on defendant's decision to stand
trial "clearly improper"), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1031 (1985); United States v. Wright, 533 F.2d 214,
216 (5th Cir. 1976) (prohibiting trial court from pressuring defendants to confess guilt before
imposing sentence); Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1974) (ruling that
defendant's decision to exercise right to trial by jury must have no effect on sentencing
decision).
212. Compare Fielding v. LeFerve, 548 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that trial
judge's alleged threat of more severe sentence should defendant go to trial would, if true,
'establish a per se violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial") and United
States v. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319, 320-21 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that imposition of more severe
sentence for exercising right to trial constitutes infringement of constitutional rights and
remanding for clearer statement of trial judge's reasons why defendants who stood trial received
harsher sentences than those who pled guilty) with Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069, 1073
(5th Cir. 1969) (noting that more severe sentence may not be imposed in response to
defendant's unsuccessful attempt to exercise constitutional right to trial), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1018 (1970) and Jones, 973 F.2d at 936 (ignoring Fielding Capriola, and Baker on grounds that
they predated "critical Supreme Court developments").
213. Compare United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
Sentencing Guidelines do not reverse prohibition against retaliating for defendant's decision to
exercise right to trial), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1585 (1992) and United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d
756, 774 (6th Cir. 1990) (barring district judge from penalizing defendant for exercising
constitutional right even if evidence of guilt is overwhelming) and United States v. Watt, 910
F.2d 587, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting judge from factoring exercise of constitutional
rights into sentencing decision) with Jones, 973 F.2d at 936 (ignoring Monroe Frost and Watt
because they "rely on outdated precedents" and fail to consider relevant Supreme Court
developments on differential sentencing, "especially Corbitt Goodwin, and Smith").
214. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 934 (recognizing that state may provide legislative incentives for
guilty pleas) (citing Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978)).
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The Supreme Court in Corbitt conceded, however, that the state's
legitimate interest in inducing guilty pleas215  derives from
Bordenkirche 16 and even earlier cases that had acknowledged the
efficiency advantages of plea bargaining.217  The circuit courts that
decided cases preceding Corbitt therefore had ample opportunity to
consider the advantages of encouraging guilty pleas, and they
determined that it is not the judge's role to supply this type of
encouragement. 21
8
Second, the panel identified United States v. Goodwin 19 as the first
decision to adopt a narrow definition of vindictiveness that includes
the "illegitimate" concern over personal inconvenience of the judge
or prosecutor but excludes "legitimate" concern over the waste of
prosecutorial or judicial resources. 22' The Bordenkircher decision,
however, actually predates Goodwin in adopting such a narrow view of
vindictiveness. 21  In both cases, the Supreme Court made efforts to
avoid labelling as "vindicative" outcomes produced through the give-
and-take bargaining that occurs between prosecutors and defense
counsel before trial.222 Given the importance of the plea bargaining
context of Bordenkircher and Goodwin, it is not surprising that other
circuits have readily applied the narrow definition of vindictiveness to
circumstances where judges unilaterally increase sentences because
defendants opted for trial.2 3
215. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222 (1978) (citing numerous authorities in
support of proposition that state has legitimate interest in encouraging guilty pleas).
216. See id. at 221 (stating that "there is no difference of constitutional significance" between
Bordenkircher and case at issue).
217. Id. at 222 n.12 (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) for proposition that
.properly administered" scheme encouraging guilty pleas "can benefit all concerned" and
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) in support of assertion that disposition of
charges through plea discussions is "essential component" in administration ofjustice).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir.) (noting that although
many factors are relevant at sentencing, court is prohibited from using sentencing power as
"carrot and stick" to clear congested dockets), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973).
219. 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
220. See United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (asserting that Court in
Goodwin reconciled tension in precedent by settling on definition of vindictiveness that only
prevents action motivated by illegitimate concern about loss of face), affid, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
221. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1978) (finding that prosecutor's
desire to encourage guilty plea by threatening to reindict defendant on more serious charge
does not constitute vindictiveness because prosecutor's motivation comports with legitimate
policy of plea bargaining).
222. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 (drawing comparison to Bordenkircherand noting that both
cases arose from pretrial conduct on part of prosecutor).
223. See Longval v. Meachum, 651 F.2d 818, 820-21 (lst Cir. 1981) (finding support in North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) for
conclusion that judge's warning that defendant would receive substantial prison sentence for
refusing to plead guilty created appearance of vindictiveness), vacated and remanded; 458 U.S.
1102, on remand, 693 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1982) (reaffirming original finding of vindictiveness
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The panel also failed in its attempt to dismiss the contrary circuit
court precedent by citing the age of the line of Supreme Court cases
prohibiting sentencing differentials.224 Clearly these Court cases
remain good law225 because the Court has explicitly denied the
existence of any tension between the earlier and later decisions. 26
4. Judicial construction of section 3El. 1 as support for sentence
enhancements
While ignoring contrary circuit court precedent, the panel found
support in another line of circuit court cases that upholds the
constitutionality of section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 22 7
These cases acknowledge that it is a rare situation where a defendant
who stands trial will be eligible for a sentence reduction 228 and,
therefore, section 3E1.1 makes the defendant's decision to go to trial
even more difficult. 229 The circuits, however, uphold section 3E1.1's
constitutionality on the grounds that not every burden on a
and distinguishing Goodwin on basis that judicial coercion is more serious than prosecutorial
coercion alleged in Goodwin), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983). ContraJones, 973 F.2d at 936 n.3
(dismissing Longval as being concerned with judge's apparent bias in issuing pretrial warnings
and asserting that pattern of differential sentencing after trial does not create problems of
judicial impartiality).
224. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 933 (stating that Supreme Court decisions that seem to prohibit
sentencing differentials are 20 years old).
225. See id. at 944 (Mikva, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I was not aware
that Supreme Court decisions have a twenty year shelf-life.").
226. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372 (noting that continuous theme in opinions is that
punishment for exercising legal rights is due process violation).
227. See supra note 99 (listing cases that have upheld facial constitutionality of § 3E1.1); see
also U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3El.1, comment. (n.3) (providing that entry of plea of guilty prior
to commencement of trial is significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility).
228. See United States v. Guadagno, 970 F.2d 214, 225 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that
defendant who chose not to plead guilty was not punished for exercising right to trial pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3El.1, comment. (n.2) (providing that
defendant who stands trial will have difficulty proving acceptance of responsibility unless
defendant goes to trial to challenge issue not related to "factual guilt," such as constitutionality
of statute or application of statute to defendant's conduct).
The circuits have split on whether going to trial to raise certain defenses, such as entrapment,
constitutes a challenge to factual guilt that bars a defendant from a reduction for acceptance
of responsibility. Compare United States v. Haddad, 976 F.2d 1088,1095 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that net impact of defendant's stance, which featured entrapment defense, was one of
nonacceptance of responsibility) with United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1451 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding that sentence reduction for accepting responsibility is not necessarily
incompatible with entrapment defense) and United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir.)
(encountering difficulty in reconciling claim of entrapment with acceptance of responsibility,
but concluding that two are not necessarily inconsistent), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 399 (1991) and
United States v. Fleener, 900 F.2d 914, 918 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting notion that invocation of
entrapment defense precludes reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
229. See United States v. Cordell, 924 F.2d 614, 619 (6th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that §
3E1.1 may affect defendant's choice whether to exercise constitutional rights).
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defendant's decision to go to trial is impermissible.230 Furthermore,
these decisions admit the difficulty of distinguishing between denial
of leniency and enhancement of punishment.231 The panel con-
cluded that, given the circuit courts' reasoning in support of section
3E1.1, there is no constitutional barrier to prevent a judge from
creating a sentencing scheme that encourages defendants to waive
their rights to trial.
232
A closer reading of the cases that uphold section 3E1.1, however,
reveals that they pointedly denounce schemes that penalize defen-
dants for exercising constitutional rights.23' These cases have
maintained repeatedly that defendants may not be subjected to more
severe punishment for exercising their constitutional right to stand
trial.234
The application, as opposed to the interpretation, of section 3E1.1
also refutes the panel's conclusion that the provision supports the
action of the district courtjudge in Jones. In fact, the appellate review
process has operated to ensure that defendants are not denied the
benefit of leniency solely because they exercised the right to trial.3 5
Furthermore, the Sentencing Commission has amended section 3E1.1
in order to mitigate some of the provision's more coercive as-
pects.2 6  First, section 3E1.1 specifies that a plea of guilty is merely
one factor that may justify a reduction of sentence for acceptance of
230. See United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that §
3E1.1 may add to defendant's dilemmas but provision was not intended to punish defendant for
exercising rights) (citing United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1497 (D. Or. 1988)).
231. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 n.4 (1980) (noting difficulty in drawing
'principled distinction" between benefit and penalty); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826
(5th Cir.) (finding that grant of leniency to defendants who plead guilty does not mean that
those who stand trial are penalized), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989). But see Brief of Amicus
Curiae on Behalf of Appellant at 4, United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (No.
91-3025) (pointing out that Court in Roberts did not reach issue of punishment for exercising
constitutional right because no such claim had been properly presented), af'd, 975 F.2d 1475
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
232. Jones, 973 F.2d at 937.
233. SeeBriefofAmicus Curiae on Behalf of Appellant at 2,Jones (No. 91-3025) (arguing that
cases in fact "refute" majority position).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 105 (2d Cir.) (rejecting notion that
sentence reduction for defendant who waives right to trial is equivalent to increase in sentence
for one who does not), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 872 (1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d
1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding prohibition on increased punishment for exercising right
to trial "settled in this and other circuits"); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 n.6 (1 lth
Cir. 1989) (stating that "nothing in section 3E1.1 authorizes enhancement of punishment").
235. See United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1992) (remanding case to
district court for additional findings as to reasons for denying reduction based on acceptance
of responsibility), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 478, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1306 (1993).
236. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 57 Fed.
Reg. 20,148, 20,156 (1992) (replacing language requiring clear demonstration that defendant
recognizes and affirms acceptance of personal responsibility for criminal conduct with
requirement that "defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense").
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responsibility3 7 Second, the commentary to section 3El.1 states
that a plea of guilty does not entitle the defendant to a reduction."
Third, the Sentencing Commission has recently amended section
3El.1 to prevent the provision from being used in a way that penalizes
the defendant for exercising his or her Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination. 239
5. The requirement that judges engage in differential sentencing
The panel also asserted that the "interest in preserving prosecutori-
al and judicial resources through lesser sentences requires that judges
engage in differential sentencing."2 °  The panel posited that
differential sentencing is the only way to make guilty pleas attractive
to defendants.24' To demonstrate its proposition, the panel present-
ed the defendant's decision to plead guilty in economic terms.242
The panel reasoned that defendants weigh the expected severity of a
sentence issued in response to a guilty plea against the expected
severity of a sentence issued upon a guilty verdict. 3 The panel
suggested that the possibility of acquittal is not, by itself, a sufficient
237. U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3El.1, comment. (n.1).
238. U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1, comment. (n.3) (stating that guilty plea prior to trial
combined with truthful admission of involvement in offense will satisfy acceptance of
responsibility requirement unless it is outweighed by other inconsistent conduct by defendant).
239. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 20,157 (explaining that
original version of § 3E1.1 caused confusion in that courts required defendant to accept
responsibility for all conduct related to offense charged rather than merely for charged
conduct). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988), the amendments to § 3E1.1 became law on
November 1, 1992 because Congress did not take any action to the contrary. The new
commentary provides:
Note that a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant
conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction under
subsection (a). A defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond
the offense of conviction without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction under this
subsection. However, a defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant
conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with
acceptance of responsibility ....
U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1) (a).
Prior to adoption of the amendment, the circuits disagreed over the question of the
constitutionality of considering uncharged conduct for reductions in sentence for acceptance
of responsibility. Compare United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir.) (finding that
for § 3El.1 to apply, defendant must accept responsibility for all conduct, not merely charged
conduct), cert. denied 498 U.S. 846 (1990) with United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463
(1st Cir. 1989) (reading § 3El.1 as requiring that defendant need only accept responsibility for
charged conduct to which he pleads guilty).
240. United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added), afl'd, 997
F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
241. See hi. (reasoning that guilty plea will be attractive only if accused believes possible
sentence after guilty plea is less than possible sentence after trial by considering average
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incentive for defendants to plead guilty.2' Thus, judges must either
raise the cost of going to trial by increasing the post-verdict sentence
or provide a greater sentence reduction for those who plead
guilty.245
While the panel cited authority that suggests that judges engage in
this kind of economic calculus when making sentencing determina-
tions,246 it provided no empirical evidence to demonstrate that
defendants make determinations based on the same model.247
Indeed, in a system of determinate sentencing such as that provided
by the Sentencing Guidelines, the prosecutor holds more discretion
than the defendant to engage in plea bargaining.248 The burden of
reducing the strain on judicial resources therefore rests largely on the
prosecutor. Where, as in Jones, the prosecutor refuses to plea
bargain,249 the sentencing judge should not punish the defendant
for contributing to the inefficiency of the judicial system.25 ° Such
penalties treat defendants "merely as a means subservient to the
purposes" 1 of clearing crowded court dockets.
C. The En Banc Opinion
1. The judge's order as a denial of a benefit
In sharp contrast to the panel, a majority of the D.C. Circuit,
244. Id.
245. See id. (illustrating proposition with example that, if all defendants convicted of same
crime were sentenced to 10 years and one-quarter were acquitted, expected value of going to
trial would be 7.5 years, and positing that defendants would not plead guilty if they thought
guilty plea would result in sentence longer than 7.5 years).
246. See id. at 938 n.6 (describing plea bargaining as market system where negotiated pleas
set price of crime relative to expectations such as expected level of sentence if case proceeds to
trial) (citing Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
949, 959-60 (1986)).
247. See Brief of Anicus Curiae on Behalf of Appellant at 7, United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d
928 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3025) (relating from experience that no defendant represented
by Federal Public Defender has ever made decision based on majority's calculus), affd, 997 K2d
1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc) (No. 91-3025), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
248. SeeTerance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea BargainingPractices UnderDeterminate Sentencing.
An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 156
(1987) (noting general hypothesis that any increase in use of plea bargaining may be
attributable to displacement of discretion from judge to prosecutor).
249. Jon, 973 F.2d at 932.
250. See Brief for Appellant for Rehearing En Banc at 7 n.4, United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d
928 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3025) (arguing thatjudges should avoid engaging in differential
sentencing where government refused to enter into plea negotiations to conserve prosecutorial
andjudicial resources), affd, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed.
2d 704 (1994). The defendant did not challenge the practice of plea bargaining, only the
court's conclusion that judges must engage in differential sentencing in order to preserve the
practice of plea bargaining. Id.
251. KANT, supra note 25, at 195.
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sitting en banc in United States v. Jones, characterized the six-month
differential thatJones received for going to trial as a denial of the full
benefit allowed under the Sentencing Guidelines.2 52 In order to
establish that the differential constituted a denial of a benefit, the en
banc court quoted at length from the sentencing transcript.2 3
The transcript reveals that the en banc court was partially correct
in its account of Judge Jackson's order. It is true that the trial judge
first inquired as to whether the defendant was due the "full credit"
allowed under the Guidelines.254 It also was reasonable for the
judge to conclude that the defendant's admission of guilt constituted
a "meager basis"255 upon which to give full credit. As the en banc
court correctly noted, the judge gave the defendant the "'major
portion' of the 'benefit"' 6 for acceptance of responsibility, but
imposed a sentence that was six months longer than that available if
full credit had been granted for acceptance of responsibility.2
7
Nevertheless, the en banc court mischaracterized the sentencing
order as a denial of a full benefit.28 The trial judge had explicitly
linked the defendant's decision to go to trial to the six-month
"additional" prison term.259
The en banc court's interpretation allowed it to avoid the constitu-
tional question of whether ajudge may increase a sentence for failure
to plead guilty.2 ° When the trial judge had asked for guidance on
this specific question,261 the panel opinion responded to the judge's
request by undertaking a thorough examination of the constitutional
issues associated with a sentence enhancement.262  The en banc
252. See United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc) (asserting
that sentencing transcript makes clear that judge was not enhancing defendant's punishment),
cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
253. Id. at 1475-77.
254. Sentencing Transcript at 2-3, United States v.Jones (No. 90-240) (D.D.C.Jan. 24, 1991).
255. Id. at 3.
256. Jones, 997 F.2d at 1477 (quoting Sentencing Transcript at 13, Jones (No. 90-240)).
257. See Sentencing Transcript at 13, Jones (No. 90-240) (expressing discomfort with
imposing minimum Guideline sentence because defendant who pled guilty could receive same
sentence).
258. Jones, 997 F.2d at 1477 (asserting sentencing transcript's clarity regarding judge's partial
denial of full benefit for acceptance of responsibility).
259. See Sentencing Transcript at 13, Jones (No. 90-240) (stating that "because... the case
did go to trial, I am going to add an additional six months to the Guideline sentence").
260. Jones, 997 F.2d at 1488 (Wald, J., dissenting) (asserting that court went "out of its way"
to "avoid a troublesome constitutional conflict").
261. See Sentencing Transcript at 13,Jones (No. 90-240) ("I would like to have some thought
given to the considerations I've articulated here today."); see alsoJones, 997 F.2d at 1480 (Mikva,
Cj., dissenting) (declaring that court "ought not fudge" when "an Article Three trial judge" calls
for validation or invalidation of sentence in criminal case).
262. See United States v.Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 932-88 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (analyzing constitution-
al issues raised by applying precedent from other circuits and Supreme Court decisions), aft'd,
997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994); see also supra
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court's characterization avoids such an analysis and further evades a
discussion of the policy goals underlying plea bargaining.263  The
following analysis, however, reveals that such issues are unavoidable,
regardless of how the sentence is characterized.
2. Grants of leniency to defendants who plead guilty require withholding
of leniency to those who do not
Having characterized the sentence as a denial of a benefit as
opposed to a penalty, the en banc court upheld such a denial on the
grounds that the granting of leniency to defendants who plead guilty
requires the withholding of leniency from those who do not."8 The
court identified the constitutional precedent that allows judges to
show leniency to defendants who accept responsibility for their
crimes. The court reasoned that the "whole notion of showing
leniency to some deserving defendants" requires the withholding of
leniency from less deserving individuals.2  In determining when to
withhold leniency, the court asserted that, "[i]n the absence of... a
'Remorse-o-meter,"' a sentencing judge should look to objective
conduct such as a guilty plea.267 In support of its conclusion that
the failure to plead guilty requires the withholding of leniency, the
court cited commentary accompanying the 1990 version of section
3EL. 1 that advised against giving credit for acceptance of responsibility
where a defendant has not pled guilty.21
The court's assertion that there is a corollary between a reward and
a denial of a reward appears true on its face. A reward is, by
definition, available only to those who deserve it.269 In the context
of sentencing, however, ascertaining whether a defendant is deserving
involves the consideration of a number of factors, only one of which
is the decision to plead guilty.2 Thus, if a corollary existed, section
3E1.1 would mandate an automatic reduction for pleading guilty and
an automatic denial of that reduction for exercising the right to trial.
notes 161-251 and accompanying text (presenting panel's analysis of constitutional issues).
263. See Jones, 997 F.2d at 1478 (stating that court need not address question of systemic
benefit of reducing number of trials).
264. Id.
265. See id
266. Id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (7th Cir. 1974)).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1478 & n.2; see 1991 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3E1.1 comment. (n.2) (stating that
"adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of
proof at trial").
269. SeeWEBSTr'S THiR NEwINTERNATIONALDIcrONARYat 1945 (1986) (defining "reward"
as "something that is given in return for good or evil done or received").
270. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3El.l, comment (n.1) (listing factors that judge may
consider as evidence of acceptance of responsibility).
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Section 3E1.1 mandates neither.271 Indeed, as noted by Judge Wald
in her dissent, there is evidence that the Sentencing Commission
intentionally omitted such an automatic reduction in order to avoid
the "constitutional dilemma of appearing to inflict a fixed penalty on
defendants insisting upon a trial."2 72  As was indicated previous-
ly,273 the case law also has precluded judges from denying defen-
dants a benefit solely for pleading guilty.27 4
3. Judicial discretion to grant a partial benefit for acceptance of
responsibility under the Guidelines
The en banc court also upheld the judge's purported denial of
leniency on the grounds that the sentence was well below the
mandatory minimum for the defendant's offense, even though it was
six months longer than it would have been had the judge granted full
credit for accepting responsibility.27 The court noted that the
presumptive sentencing range for the defendant's offense was 151-188
months.2 76 The court identified 151 months as the baseline for the
defendant's sentence.2 77  Thus, the court reasoned, any sentence
below the baseline of 151 months could not properly be characterized
as an enhanced sentence.2 7' According to the court, the trial judge
merely gave the defendant four-fifths of the full credit available under
the Guidelines for accepting responsibility.279
The court's conclusion that the judge had the discretion to grant
such a partial benefit2' is flawed. Judge Jackson did not have
discretion under the Guidelines to impose a sentence that was
271. CompareU.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1 comment. (n.3) (explaining that guilty plea does
not automatically entitle defendant to adjustment) with U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3E1.1 comment.
(n.2) (stating that trial conviction does not automatically preclude sentence adjustment, but that
it is rare situation where defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility after
exercising right to trial).
272. Jones, 997 F.2d at 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing Dan
Freed & Marc Miller, Plea Bargained Sentences, Disparity and "GuidelineJustice", 3 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 175, 176 (1991) and Breyer, supra note 91, at 28-29).
273. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (presenting cases where court looked with
disfavor upon denial of benefit for sole reason that defendant went to trial).
274. See United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1992) (remanding to district
court to make additional findings as to reasons for denying benefit of acceptance of
responsibility reduction), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 478, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1306 (1993); see
also supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing Sitton).
275. See Jones, 997 F.2d at 1478-79 (explaining view that defendant's sentence was not
impermissible burden on constitutional right to trial).
276. Id. at 1478.
277. Id. at 1479.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 1479-80 (rejecting appellant's argument that Guidelines do not permit grant
of partial credit).
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between the mandatory minimum and the full credit for acceptance
of responsibility merely because he believed the mandatory minimum
of 151 months to be "barbaric."2 ' Given this sentiment, the judge
had only two choices: to sentence the defendant to the minimum of
151 months or to grant the two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, whereby the defendant would serve 121 months.2
The Guidelines contain no provision for partial credit for acceptance
of responsibility.23
Such a partial credit was held invalid in United States v. Valencia.2s4
In Valencia, the Fifth Circuit ruled that ajudge could not grant a one-
level reduction in sentence for acceptance of responsibility.285 The
court expressed concern that, by permitting a one-level reduction, it
would allow trial judges to "straddle the fence in close cases without
explicitly finding whether the defendant did or did not accept
responsibility."2s  The rule adopted by the court in Jones has even
more deleterious effects than the outcome ultimately rejected in
Valencia. This is true because Jones allows judges both to straddle the
fence regarding acceptance of responsibility and to consider against
the defendant the exercise of a constitutional right.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Ultimately, as indicated by the foregoing analysis of the en banc
and panel opinions, the distinction between sentence enhancement
and denial of a benefit is irrelevant. Concerns of constitutional
magnitude arise, as Judge Wald rightly noted in her dissent to the en
banc opinion, whenever ajudge considers, for purposes of sentencing,
the exercise of a constitutional right against a defendant.287 The
Jones case, therefore, highlights the need for Congress, through the
Sentencing Commission, to clarify the boundaries within which a
judge may make sentencing determinations based on a defendant's
decision to go to trial.
The Sentencing Commission should consider proposing amend-
281. Sentencing Transcript at 12, United States v.Jones, No. 90-240 (D.D.C.Jan. 24, 1991).
282. But see Jones, 997 F.2d at 1479 (reasoning that reliance on judge's observations is not
relevant under Guidelines).
283. See U.S.S.G., supra note 9, § 3El.1 & comment.
284. 957 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1992).
285. United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1992).
286. Id. But see Jones, 997 F.2d at 1479 (distinguishing Valencia in part because that court did
not address concern that judge is barred from considering "belated and limited character" of
acceptance of responsibility when sentencing within adjusted Guidelines range).
287. See Jones, 997 F.2d at 1484 (Wald, J., dissenting) (asserting that judges are prohibited
from counting choice to go to trial as negative evidence of acceptance of responsibility either
in enhancing sentence or denying credit).
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ments for congressional enactment that would prevent judges from
burdening the exercise of the right to trial at sentencing. Two
avenues exist for sentencing reform, and the Commission should
consider both. First, the Commission should propose an amendment
to section 3E1.1 to prohibit judges from imposing enhanced
sentences or denying the benefit of a sentencing reduction for the sole
reason that a defendant pled guilty.
Through such an amendment the Commission has an opportunity
to establish a bright-line rule prohibiting judges from using the
decision to go to trial as negative evidence against the defendant
when considering sentencing.288 At the same time, the Commission
has an occasion to establish a rule that affirms the longstanding
practice of evaluating a defendant's decision to plead guilty as positive
evidence in the defendant's favor.8 9 Such a practice is valuable
because it encourages plea bargaining in a way that benefits both the
defendant and society. This mutual benefit is better suited to the
notion of plea bargain-as-contract than is the practice of weighing the
exercise of a constitutional right against a defendant.
Nevertheless, one argument against establishing a bright-line rule
that prohibits judges from weighing the decision to go to trial against
a defendant is that judges would find their discretion unreasonably
constrained by such a rule. 9° For example, it is possible to argue
that under such a rule, ajudge could not deny a reduction if the only
evidence of failure to accept responsibility were the decision to go to
trial. Requiring defendants to offer and judges to accept additional
evidence suggesting contrition, however, is not unreasonable given the
importance of preserving constitutional rights.291
Another objection to a bright-line rule prohibiting judges from
considering the exercise of a constitutional right is the possibility that
such a prohibition would "ensure a lack of candor in sentencing." 2
288. See United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193, 197 (11th Cir.) (holding that judge may
not balance exercise of constitutional rights against "defendant's expression of remorse"), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 649 (1992).
289. See Corbittv. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978) (allowing state to burden exercise
of right to trial by encouraging guilty pleas); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970)
(permitting state to offer benefit to defendants through lenient sentencing where defendants
offer benefit to state by confessing guilt).
290. Supplemental Brief and Record Material for Appellee at 28-29, United States v. Jones,
973 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3025) (concluding that prohibitions on considering
exercise of right to trial require "unrealistic feats of mental gymnastics"), affd, 997 F.2d 1475
(D.C. Cir. 1993), ert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1994).
291. SeeJones, 997 F.2d at 1487 (Wald,J., dissenting) (arguing that, if defendant offers other
timely affirmative evidence of acceptance of responsibility, decision to exercise right to trial
should not be counted against him).
292. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 28-29,Jones (No. 91-3025).
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Judges, however, would be more likely to be wary of revealing their
motives under the rule adopted in Jones. The decision encourages
judges to portray what is actually an enhancement for going to trial
as a denial of a full benefit.293
If Congress or the Commission allows the Jones decision to stand,
it is likely that other circuits, also facing tremendous strains on
judicial resources, would allow their judges to establish sentence
enhancement schemes.9 4 Such sentencing practices would chill the
exercise of the constitutional right to trial and lead to an increase in
false guilty pleas. Allowing judges to encourage pleas of guilty
through sentence enhancements would also cause defendants to
question the neutrality of judges at trial.
Under some circumstances, a limited burdening of the right to trial
in order to reduce the strain on prosecutorial and judicial resources
is permissible, especially where the defendant stands to gain from the
scheme. Such a scheme, however, is best developed by the Sentenc-
ing Commission or Congress, not by the courts. The Jones decision
demonstrates the danger posed to constitutional rights if courts are
allowed to encourage guilty pleas. The decision permits judges to
take unilateral action to reduce crowded dockets by encouraging
guilty pleas through differential sentencing. Such unilateral judicial
action, though, conflicts with the policy of some prosecutors to
abstain from plea negotiations. The Jones decision thus resolves what
is essentially a policy conflict between the judicial and executive
branches of government by penalizing the defendant. Such a
resolution ultimately bears too high a cost because of its potential to
chill the exercise of the constitutional right to trial.
Second, Congress or the Sentencing Commission should reform the
Guidelines' mandatory minima. Currently, the mandatory minima for
many offenses, particularly certain drug offenses, are excessive.295
There is evidence that the excessive penalties reduce the frequency
of guilty pleas.296 Given the prospect of lengthy mandatory sentenc-
293. SeeJones, 997 F.2d at 1487 (Wald, J., dissenting) (asserting that prohibiting judges from
weighing exercise of constitutional rights "more faithfully preserves the constitutional neutrality
of the Guidelines scheme").
294. Cf. Carter v. Kane, No. 90-6639, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8828, at *13-20 (E.D. Pa. June
30, 1993) (recounting panel decision in Jones as support for notion that sentencing judge may,
on her own, enhance defendant's sentence for refusal to plead guilty).
295. SeeFEDERAL CTS. STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITEE 134
(1990) (voicing concern that mandatory minima "create penalties so distorted as to hamper
federal criminal adjudication").
296. Id. The Federal Courts Study Committee reported:
[L] engthy mandatory minimum sentences seriously frustrate the normal and salutary
process of pretrial settlements in criminal cases. Even defendants who have little doubt
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es, defendants have little incentive to plead guilty, especially where
the available reduction for pleading guilty is disproportionately small
when compared to the mandatory minimum sentence. Through the
elimination of excessive sentences, defendants would have more
incentive to plead guilty, prosecutors would gain a greater advantage
in plea negotiations, and courts would benefit from a decreased
burden on their dockets. Most important, all these benefits would be
achieved without chilling the exercise of a constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
By allowing judges to weigh the decision to go to trial as the sole
evidence of failure to accept responsibility, the D.C. Circuit in United
States v. Jones establishes a dangerous precedent that will undoubtedly
chill the exercise of the right to trial. Explicitly in its panel opinion
and implicitly in its en banc opinion, the court demonstrates a
legitimate concern for the conservation of judicial resources. The
zealousness with which the court attended to this concern, however,
led to an infringement of an individual's constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the court evidences little regard for the distinct roles of
the judicial, executive, and legislative branches in an adversarial
system of criminaljustice. The questions the court raises concerning
the extent to which judges may burden the right to trial merit
consideration. Ultimately, it is possible to preserve both the constitu-
tional right to trial and scarce judicial resources by prohibiting judges
from weighing the decision to go to trial as the sole evidence of
failure to accept responsibility while permitting leniency toward those
who plead guilty.
of the likelihood that they will be found guilty are more likely to take their chances on
trial when faced with the possibility of a lengthy minimum sentence.... Many district
judges have reported such developments to the committee.
Id.; see also Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 23-26, United States v. Jones, 126 L. Ed. 2d 704
(1994) (arguing that excessive mandatory minimum sentences have caused decline in plea
bargaining).
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